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PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS
Stewart E. Sterk*
Clarity can be a considerable virtue in property rights. But even when
property rights are defined clearly in the abstract, ascertaining the scope
of those rights in concrete situations often entails significant cost. In some
instances, the cost of acquiring information about the scope of property
rights will exceed the social value of that information. In those circum-
stances, further search for information about the scope of rights is
inefficient; the social harm avoided by further search does not justify the
costs of the search.
Potential resource users, however make decisions based on private costs
and benefits, not social costs and benefits. Legal rules can create incen-
tives to search for information even when the search would be inefficient.
In particular "property rule" protection often gives leverage to right hold-
ers disproportionate to the harm those right holders would suffer from
intrusion on their rights. That leverage, in turn, gives potential resource
users private incentives to expend time and money on search even when
search will generate minimal social benefit. "Liability rule" protection, by
contrast, limits incentives to conduct inefficient search for the scope of
property rights.
Property doctrine reflects this insight in a number of contexts. Thus, high
search costs can explain the unwillingness of courts to award injunctive re-
lief in cases of "innocent" boundary encroachments, as well as the
Supreme Court's recent limitations on the routine award of injunctive relief
in patent and copyright cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The scope of many property rights is not self-evident. A potential user of
resources will often be less than completely certain whether use of those
resources infringes on the rights of a property owner. Obtaining the informa-
tion necessary to resolve that uncertainty comes at a cost.
What impact, if any, should these uncontroversial propositions have for
the remedies available to a property owner when a resource user infringes
on the owner's rights? That question has generated little attention in the
now-voluminous literature on the remedies available to property owners
against encroaching users.
Consider a simple real property law hypothetical. Bush and Clinton own
adjacent land. Bush holds an easement over a strip of Clinton's land on their
common boundary-but neither of them knows of the easement, which was
negotiated between their predecessors thirty years ago. Clinton expands his
house, and the extension encroaches onto a portion of the easement. Bush
learns of the easement a year later, when he plans renovation of his house,
and needs a way to get construction equipment to the back of his house. The
portion of the easement on which Clinton has not built, together with space
on Bush's own land, is wide enough to permit the equipment to pass. As a
result, the harm to Bush amounts to, at most, a few hundred dollars, repre-
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senting the loss of a few shrubs that might be trampled by construction
equipment on Bush's side of the boundary line-shrubs that would not be
trampled if Bush could use the easement's full width. Rebuilding Clinton's
extension to avoid encroachment would cost Clinton $50,000.
What remedy should be available to Bush for Clinton's encroachment
onto the easement? Should Bush be entitled to "property rule" protection-
an injunction against Clinton's encroachment? Or should Bush be limited to
"liability rule" protection-an award of money damages against Clinton? Or
should Bush be denied relief altogether? In addressing issues of remedy, the
academic literature has focused on efficiency concerns.' Much of the focus
has been on ex post concerns-minimizing inefficiencies once a dispute
between the parties has arisen.2 Recent literature, however, has shifted focus
to ex ante concerns-developing a legal structure that minimizes the risk of
conflict before it arises.3 From the ex ante perspective, Henry Smith has
identified a significant advantage of property rules: the holder of a right pro-
tected by a property rule has more incentive to invest in producing
information about productive uses of property than a right holder in a re-
4gime of liability rules. That is, concentrating rights in a single owner
enables that owner to coordinate use of the "owned" resource.
I. See infra text accompanying notes 11-43.
2. The seminal article focusing on ex post concerns is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089 (1972). Other leading examples include Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargain-
ing: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 713 (1996); and A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics
of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
3. Jim Krier and Stewart Schwab were among the first to emphasize the effect liability rules
might have on ex ante behavior of parties. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and
Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 462-464 (1995). Carol
Rose has noted that the emphasis on ex post concerns emerged from tort and contract scholars with
a tendency to shortchange "the considerations uppermost in conventional property law-planning,
effort, and investment." Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2188
(1997). Richard Epstein has emphasized the impact of liability rules on "the security of possession
and the security of exchange needed for complex commercial life and a satisfying personal one."
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE
L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997).
4. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1729, 1755-64
(2004).
5. Thus, Henry Smith has noted that property rules, which give to a single owner the right
to exclude others from a particular resource, provide incentives for that owner to become a clearing-
house for information about the resource:
Owners are closest to their assets and will be in a position both to develop information about
(and attachment to) their assets and will be the recipients of information in the form of offers
from potential purchasers. Owners are likely often to be the least-cost generators of informa-
tion about assets, even if this information is not verifiable to third parties. Takers will likely be
closer to assets than courts, and will be able to evaluate assets currently held by owners. Under
exclusion and property rule protection, people in this position have to make offers ....
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 985
(2004) (footnote omitted). By contrast, with liability rules:
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The ex ante coordination advantage of property rules, however, depends
critically on shared and accurate information about the boundaries of legal
rights. If the scope of those rights is unclear, an "owner" cannot coordinate
use of a resource until both she and potential users acquire information
about the scope of her rights. Acquiring that information, however, requires
search, which can be costly.
The potentially high cost of search to ascertain the scope of property
rights leads to the insights explored in this Article. First, in some instances,
the cost of acquiring information about the scope of property rights will ex-
ceed the social value of that information. Returning to our hypothetical,
Clinton could not discover the existence or scope of Bush's easement with-
out incurring private costs necessary to hire a lawyer (to discover the
existence and terms of the easement) and a surveyor (to ascertain the loca-
tion of the easement on the ground). The social costs Clinton would avoid
by acquiring that information, however, are small. At most, if Clinton had
learned of the easement and its location before expanding his house, he
could have built in a way that would have avoided Bush's loss of a few hun-
dred dollars in shrubbery. But even that measure overstates the social loss
that additional information would prevent.
Second, even if the social cost of search is greater than its social value,
the private value of search to a potential resource user may, in a property-
rule regime, exceed its private cost, providing the potential resource user
with excessive incentive to seek information about the scope of property
rights. That is, the search for information might alter the distribution of
wealth between the improver and the neighbor, and thereby generate private
gains to the party incurring the search costs, while generating no compara-
ble social gains.7 In concrete terms, the social cost of expanding Clinton's
house without checking deeds and commissioning a survey may only be a
few hundred dollars, but the potential private cost to Clinton is much higher,
because Bush can compel Clinton to remove the encroaching addition to his
house, giving Bush leverage in negotiations far in excess of the social cost
of the encroachment. Hence, property-rule protection threatens to generate
inefficient expenditures in acquiring information about the scope of legal
rights.
The importance of this insight does not depend on the belief that next-
door neighbors will be so calculating in their decisionmaking, or in their
dealings with each other. The basic problems-uncertainty about the scope
[T]akers can use information about assets and their owners to cherry-pick those undervalued
by damages rules. An owner may not be able to communicate to a court the value of a use (or
nonuse) such that damages could be given to reflect it. Takers, knowing this, can then select
vulnerable owners for taking or extortion. Even if a court could detect all opportunistic tak-
ings, the effort to do so is likely to be costly.
Id. at 985-86 (footnotes omitted); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Prop-
erty/Contract Interface, 101 COLuM. L. REv. 773, 793-96 (2001).
6. Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 793-96; Smith, supra note 5, at 985-86.
7. Cf Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
602-05 (1992) (noting differences between the private and social value of obtaining legal advice).
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of property rights and disparity between the social and private cost of ac-
quiring information about those rights-also arise in commercial settings,
where dollars typically count for more and preservation of neighborly rela-
tions for less. The problems are particularly pervasive in the case of
intellectual property rights, where boundaries tend to be less certain and
where search costs are typically higher.
The notion that expenditures made to clarify legal rights can be ineffi-
cient is counterintuitive to lawyers, who often earn their living clarifying
legal rights for their clients. My claim here, however, is a narrow one-not
that all expenditures made to clarify property rights are inefficient, but that
at some point, the marginal cost of additional clarity in the scope of property
rights exceeds the value of that clarity.8 Moreover, I do not contend that
courts should invariably eschew property-rule protection in those cases
where an encroacher's level of investigation into the scope of property rights
was inefficient. Determining which investigations are efficient is no easy
matter, even with the benefit of hindsight, and countervailing considera-
tions-such as preserving personal autonomy and avoiding the difficulty of
determining and accounting for subjective harm-often militate in favor of
property-rule protection.
As a normative matter, however, the cost and social value of acquiring
additional information about the scope of property rights should be relevant
to a court in deciding between property-rule protection and liability-rule
protection. As a descriptive matter, courts have sub silentio accounted for
the cost and value of acquiring additional information in fashioning rights
and remedies in a variety of legal contexts ranging from innocent border
encroachments 9 to copyright and patent doctrines that give courts discretion
to deny injunctive relief against certain classes of infringers.'°
I. THE REMEDIES LITERATURE
Much of the scholarly literature on property remedies starts with the
premise that information can be costly to obtain. The literature has focused
principally on the difficulty of obtaining information about the value of
property rights to potential users, resulting in potential inefficient use of
resources. Liability rules might reduce the need for, and increase the quality
of, information about values, limiting the potential for inefficient use. At the
same time, property rules create an incentive for a single party, the owner, to
invest in generating information about potential uses of the resource-an
incentive that no single party enjoys in a liability-rule regime. In focusing
on the costs of ascertaining uses and values of resources, the literature has
8. As Tom Merrill has noted, "[entitlement-determination costs ... are 'real' costs and
should not be incurred unless they are justified by the expected returns." Thomas W. Merrill, Tres-
pass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 25 n.47
(1985).
9. See infra Section III.D.
10. See infra Sections IV.B-C.
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largely ignored the costs associated with determining the scope of property
rights. These costs serve as the focus for the succeeding section.
A. The Impact of Information Costs on Ex Post Resolution
of Property Disputes
In their pathbreaking article on the comparative efficiency of property
and liability rules," Calabresi and Melamed developed what has now be-
come the conventional wisdom: property rules are efficient in cases of low
transaction costs, while liability rules are preferable in cases of high transac-
tion costs, typically defined as cases in which multiple parties generate the
potential for holdouts and freeriders. "
Calabresi and Melamed did not ignore information costs in their
pathbreaking analysis, but those costs were not their focus. Others, however,
have focused on information costs in evaluating the efficiency advantages of
injunctive relief and money damages.'3 Until recently, the focus of this
scholarship has largely been on ex post concerns: once a concrete dispute
between parties has arisen, which remedy is more likely to lead to efficient
resolution of the dispute? The scholarly literature has undermined, to a con-
siderable degree, both tenets of the conventional wisdom that emerged from
Calabresi and Melamed: that liability rules generate more efficient use in
high-transaction-cost cases, and that property rules generate more efficient
use in low-transaction-cost cases.
1. Multiple Parties and High Transaction Costs
Information costs-particularly errors in damage assessment-can gen-
erate inefficient results when courts use liability rules to deal with the
transaction costs associated with multiple-party negotiations.1 4 Although
Calabresi and Melamed focused on liability rules as a way to overcome
holdout problems, Mitchell Polinsky has noted that the same holdout prob-
.• 15
lems will obstruct negotiations after a court awards damages to the victim.
For instance, in a pollution dispute, if the court awards damages that exceed
actual harm, the polluter will stop polluting even though it would be effi-
cient for the polluter to continue, 6 while if actual harm exceeds the damages
awarded, the polluter will continue to pollute even though the pollution is
11. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
12. See id. at 1118 (noting that when transaction costs are low, property rules enable efficient
results because even when entitlements are set inefficiently, transactions would cure any errors); id.
at 1106-10 (noting that liability rules can overcome holdout and freerider problems in cases when
privately-negotiated solutions are impractical).
13. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 2; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2; Polinsky, supra note
2.
14. See, e.g., Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 453-57; Polinsky, supra note 2, at 1104-05.
15. Polinsky, supra note 2, at 1108-09.
16. Id. at 1093-94.
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inefficient. 7 As a result, a liability rule guarantees efficient results only
when damages are equal to actual harm. 8 Courts, however, do not always
have reliable information on which to base their assessments of actual harm.
The practical question, of course, is not whether a liability rule guaran-
tees efficient results in cases of high transaction costs; no rule does that. The
relevant comparison, as Jim Krier and Stewart Schwab have formulated it, is
between the ability of judges to overcome assessment cost problems and the
ability of the parties to overcome transaction cost problems.'9 Krier and
Schwab have argued that in multiple-party cases, the very facts that create
high transaction costs also generate high assessment costs, making both
property rules and liability rules problematic from an efficiency standpoint. 2°
2. Two Parties and Low Transaction Costs
Information costs have also played a central role in two arguments for
using liability rules rather than property rules, even to resolve disputes be-
tween two parties. First, litigated cases will more often generate efficient
results if courts use liability rules. Second, liability rules are more likely to
overcome strategic bargaining, and therefore reduce the need for litigation.
Both arguments focus on information: the first on the information available
to courts adjudicating disputes over property fights, and the second on the
flow of information between the disputing parties.
a. Liability Rules and Reduced Assessment Costs
Suppose parties litigate a dispute over property fights. If the court
wants to promote efficient use of the fights, but concludes that strategic
bargaining will prevent negotiations between the parties, the court must
assess the value of the parties' competing uses.2' If the court is limited to
property rules, the court has two choices: enjoin the defendant's behav-
ior, or deny relief to the plaintiff. Only one of those two alternatives
leads to efficient use, and the court cannot know which one without de-
termining the value of both uses.
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have highlighted an important advan-
tage of liability rules-they generate efficient results so long as a court can
17. Id. at 1094 n.39.
18. See id. at 1094. Polinsky analyzed a situation in which each additional unit of factory
production generated fewer returns for the factory and more harm to neighbors, rather than a more
simple model in which the factory either operates, producing harm, or shuts down, producing no
harm. As a result, in his model, no strategic behavior, and hence no inefficiency, would occur "if
liability is less than or equal to actual damages up to the efficient output (and greater than or equal
to actual damages beyond the efficient output)." Id. But the basic point remains: damages cannot
guarantee efficient results unless the court knows how much harm each unit of production generates.
19. Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 459.
20. Id. at 460-64.
21. As Kaplow and Shavell put it, "[i]f parties do not bargain with each other, the legal rule
will directly determine whether or not harm occurs." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 724.
1291May 2008]
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assess the value of one of the competing uses, rather than the value of both. 2
Thus, if a court can accurately assess the harm the defendant's use would
cause to the plaintiff, and applies a liability rule that permits the defendant
to engage in its proposed use so long as the defendant pays damages equal
to the harm caused, the court will assure efficient use even if it is ignorant of
the benefits generated by the defendant's use. If, after judgment, the defen-
dant's use is more valuable than the harm it causes, the defendant will pay
damages and pursue its use. If the defendant's use is less valuable, the de-
fendant will withdraw and plaintiff will not suffer harm. 23 As Kaplow and
Shavell put it, liability rules permit the state to "harness the information that
the injurer naturally possesses about his prevention cost. '24 The Kap-
low/Shavell argument for liability rules focuses on reducing the
information necessary for courts to assemble in order to guarantee effi-
cient decisions in those cases where strategic bargaining prevents parties
from negotiating to efficient solutions.
b. Liability Rules as an Antidote for Strategic Bargaining
Another argument for liability rules focuses on their alleged advan-
tages in generating information that might overcome strategic
bargaining. In particular, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley have argued that li-
ability rules can induce parties to reveal information that they might
withhold under a property-rule regime, increasing the likelihood that
efficient bargains will be brought to fruition. The thrust of their argu-
ment is that when entitlements are divided, as they are with liability
rules, each party is uncertain whether he will emerge as a buyer or a
seller.26 This reduces each party's incentive to misrepresent the value he
attaches to the entitlement. Property rules, by contrast, allocate the en-
tire entitlement to a single person, so that each party knows whether he
will be a seller or a buyer, creating an incentive for misrepresentation.
B. Information Coordination: The Ex Ante Advantage of Property Rules
The most prominent arguments for liability-rule protection focus on the
ex post information advantages generated in resolving existing disputes. But
what effect, if any, do liability rules have on the behavior of property owners
and potential infringers ex ante? Henry Smith has demonstrated that liability
rules reduce the incentive to collect information about productive uses of
22. Id. at 725.
23. See id.
24. Id. (emphasis omitted). Kaplow and Shavell limited their analysis to cases involving
externalities, reaching the opposite conclusion with respect to "things." Id. at 760-63.
25. Ayres & Talley, supra note 2, at 1030.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1030-31.
28. Id.
1292 [Vol. 106:1285
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty
property, decreasing the likelihood that property will be put to its most pro-
ductive use. 29 Smith argues persuasively that the holder of a right protected
by a property rule has more incentive to invest in producing information
about productive uses of the resource than does any actor (owner, taker, or
court) in a liability-rule regime.0 As Smith points out, in a property regime,
"[o]wnership concentrates on the owner the benefits of information devel-
oped about-and bets placed on-the value of the asset."3' This coordination
advantage of property rules is apparent, as Smith makes clear, in many real
property situations." Real property tends to be rivalrous in nature: two can-
not plow the same furrow. But the coordination advantage of property rules
has also been trumpeted as a justification for expansive legal protection of
nonrivalrous goods-particularly through patents and copyrights.33
Liability rules, on the other hand, inhibit coordination of resource use. If
resource rights were protected only by liability rules, no "owner" would be
in a position to coordinate resource use. Any potential user could interfere
with coordination by simply using the resource and offering to pay court-
determined damages. Competition among potential users could ultimately
prove unresolvable by the coordinating owner, and, instead, might be re-
solved only through litigation.
In more general terms, Smith and Tom Merrill have argued that property
rules are optimal for allocating resources when the potential users of the34
resource are unidentified and large in number. Property rules concentrate in
a single person a set of well-defined rights to use a particular resource, put-
ting the world on notice of the duties they owe to the "owner" of the
resource without requiring investigation into the owner's identity or prefer-
ences. Merrill and Smith argue that the property-rule approach is optimal
when information costs would make it infeasible to allocate resources by
29. Smith, supra note 4, at 1729.
30. Id. at 1729, 1755-64.
31. Id. at 1729.
32. Smith notes:
[]f someone believes that a rock formation on Blackacre will be a tourist site twenty years
from now, one can buy Blackacre, become its Owner, and wait. If, in the meantime, someone
(Taker) takes Blackacre and only has to pay damages, Owner will either have to convince a
court that the rock formation is going to be valuable or will have to bribe Taker. Under some
quite ordinary conditions, this situation will lead to social loss.
Id.
33. The seminal work is Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Kitch argues that propertization of patent rights would enable a single
owner to coordinate efficient development of patented works. Id. at 276; see also William M. Lan-
des & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 354-57
(1989) (justifying copyright protection for derivative works as necessary to avoid inefficient delays
in release of original work).
34. Property rules reflect what Merrill and Smith call an "exclusion strategy," which allo-
cates resources by giving a single owner a broad right to exclude, rather than creating finely tuned
governance rules. Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 793-94.
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contract among the many interested parties.35 Property rules reduce informa-
tion costs by permitting the single owner to coordinate use of each resource.
The information cost advantages of property rules increase with the
number of potential users of the contested right.16 When the number of po-
tential contestants for a right is high, contract solutions are impractical
because any single claimant's incentive to negotiate with other claimants is
low; whatever agreement they reach would be subverted by the appearance
of yet another claimant. 37 By contrast, when a resource has only two poten-
tial users, allocation by agreement is more feasible, and property rules that
give owners a broad right to exclude are less necessary.38
Merrill and Smith recognize that, to coordinate resource use efficiently,
property rules must be uniform, easily identified, and understood by all.39
Rules that are complex or detailed require potential claimants to process too
much information, dissipating the advantages of a system that gives a single
owner the right to exclude.0 We will return to that constraint in the next Sec-
tion.
Property-rule protection also provides an incentive for potential users-
whether one or many-to inform the right holder of the conflicts created by
the potential use, thereby setting the stage for negotiated solutions. Recent
law and economics literature has attacked the argument that property rules
promote efficiency by providing potential infringers with an incentive to
negotiate, emphasizing that any legal rule provides some party with an in-
centive to negotiate.4' That critique assumes, however, that the parties share
35. Id.
36. Moreover, the importance of providing incentives to produce information is greatest
when the number of potential uses-as opposed to users-is high. For instance, the nature and tim-
ing of efficient development requires less information production when the property in question is a
lot in a well-established, single-family subdivision than when the property is a large parcel in an
undeveloped area or an area in transition. When development conditions have been constrained by
law or by prior investment, even an owner in a property-rule regime is unlikely to make significant
investments in information because those investments are unlikely to generate significant return. As
a result, information production furnishes a less powerful reason for property rules.
37. Kaplow and Shavell have demonstrated that a liability-rule regime does not always give
owners an adequate incentive to pay infringers to stop infringing because the payment does not stop
subsequent infringers from conducting the same activity. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 765-
66. For instance, suppose an owner values the right to be free of trespass at $100, and a court would
apply a liability rule that entitles the owner to $90 in damages against a trespasser, who values the
right to trespass at $95. The owner, armed with $90 in damages, would not pay the trespasser $95 to
give up the right to trespass because another trespasser could arrive the next day, requiring repetition
of the same process. Hence, even though the owner values the right to be free of trespass more than
any trespasser values the right to trespass, no agreement will be reached.
38. Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 793 (finding no need to create rights of exclusion when
the only occupants of an island are Robinson Crusoe and Friday).
39. Id. at 794.
40. Id. at 795.
41. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1135, 1172 (2003); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 764-65. Indeed, Ayres and
Talley go further as they emphasize that liability rules can sometimes "cause more forthright and
efficient bargaining" than property rules. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consen-
sual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 237 (1995). For a
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information about potential conflicts. But a party unaware of potential com-
peting uses is unlikely to initiate negotiations to eliminate conflicts.
Typically, it is the encroacher or infringer who is in the best position to an-
ticipate conflict. Rules that induce the encroacher or infringer to disclose
conflict at the earliest moment are more likely to generate efficient settle-
ments.
Consider, for instance, a landowner who seeks to expand her house in a
way that encroaches significantly on her neighbor's lot--or even requires
bulldozing of her neighbor's house. The neighbor is unlikely to be aware of
the landowner's plans until after they have been formulated and perhaps
executed. A property rule provides maximum incentive for the landowner to
negotiate before expending money in planning and executing the house ex-
pansion, thus assuring that the value of the expansion exceeds the harm to
her neighbor. While a liability rule could theoretically provide greater incen-
tive for the neighbor to negotiate, the neighbor is far less likely to initiate
negotiations before the landowner has expended money on the encroach-
ment because the neighbor is not in a position to anticipate the conflict.
The existing literature, thus, suggests that whatever advantages liability
rules might have in overcoming ex post strategic bargaining are generally
overwhelmed by the ex ante advantages that property rules generate. Prop-
erty rules enable the "owner" of a resource to serve as a clearinghouse for
information about the values potential users attach to that resource.42 Be-
cause property rules require all potential users of a resource to buy rights
from that owner, property rules enable the owner to accumulate information
about potential bidders and the values those bidders attach to those rights. 3
As a result, property rules enable resource owners to channel those re-
sources to the bidders who value them most-promoting efficient use of
those resources.
II. THE SEARCH COST PROBLEM
An assumption underlying the information cost analysis discussed in
Part I is that property rules are relatively clear-unlike, for instance, tort
rules, which are generally assumed to be muddy." That is, the discussion
statement of the conventional position that property rules encourage negotiation where transaction
costs are low, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (4th ed. 1992) ("[T]he law
should require the parties to transact in the market; it can do this by making the present owner's
property right absolute (or nearly so), so that anyone who thinks the property is worth more has to
negotiate with the owner.").
42. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1728-29.
43. See id. at 1763-64 (noting that property rules make the owner a "broker" of rights across
time); id. at 1776 (discussing how property rules delegate to owners decisions about how much
information is optimal).
44. For the classic discussion, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988). Merrill and Smith note that "[t]he unique advantage of in rem rights ...
is that they conserve on information costs relative to in personam rights in situations where the
number of potential claimants to resources is large, and the resource in question can be defined at
relatively low cost." Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 793 (emphasis added); cf Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
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assumed the absence of search costs-the costs of obtaining information
about where and whether to acquire legal rights to use particular resource.
Only if potential resource users know that use of the resource would intrude
on someone else's property right, and can readily identify the owner of that
right, will they approach the owner, enabling the owner to act as an informa-
41tion clearinghouse. Clarity in property rights makes it possible to structure
46
a market that efficiently allocates resources.
In practice, however, property rules are often unclear-at least to the
universe of potential resource users. It may be costly for a potential resource
user to discover the need to negotiate with a right holder, or to discover the
right holder's identity. These costs arise even when rules are, from an ab-
stract legal perspective, crystal clear. The process of applying clear rules to
concrete problems often entails significant search costs. A cynic might note
that these costs are the bread and butter of many law practices, but in fact
the costs extend beyond legal bills. Scholarly analysis of property and liabil-
ity rules, however, has not accounted for these search coStS.
47
My objective in this Part is to demonstrate that search costs are often
high. Part III demonstrates that in cases of high search costs, property rules
sometimes generate excessive incentives to search. These insights require
qualification of the emerging consensus that, from an ex ante perspective,
property rules are superior to liability rules.
A. Real Property
Real property law is often treated as a refuge for clear legal rights, free
from the need to balance competing interests. 4' To take the most basic ex-
ample, I have a right to prevent my neighbor from trespassing or
encroaching on my land, and my neighbor has a correlative duty not to tres-
pass or encroach.49 This clear property rule puts my neighbor on notice that
she must deal with me if she wants to use "my" land.
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26-34 (2000) (discussing standardization of property rights as means to
reduce cost of determining property rights).
45. Cf Smith, supra note 4, at 1782 (noting that property rules minimize the need for duty-
holders to acquire information because they need to know only to "keep off"-a burden that is small
only if rights are clear).
46. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 11l YALE L.J. 357, 387 (2001) (noting an intolerable burden on potential dutyholders
if scope of rights required too much investigation-a burden that would defeat benefits of security,
investment, and planning).
47. In an early article, Tom Merrill explored the circumstances in which it might be efficient
for the legal system to develop judgmental rather than mechanical rules, despite the higher "entitle-
ment-determination costs" of judgmental rules. Merrill, supra note 8, at 25-26. His focus, however,
was on judicial determination of legal rights, not on search by private parties.
48. See Rose, supra note 44.
49. The conception of property as a set of correlative rights and duties emerged from Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913).
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But how does my neighbor know when she is trespassing or encroaching
on my land? However clear the legal rule is, it does not lay down markers on
the boundary of my land with a sign that says "keep off."50 Instead, my
neighbor may need to commission a survey to determine whether the uses
she wants to undertake will, in fact, intrude on land that belongs to me.51
Moreover, although property lawyers immediately recognize that a neighbor
needs to consult a surveyor before building near a property line, a neighbor
may not realize this unless she consults a lawyer-introducing an additional
search cost into the process.
To take another example, consider a homeowner who has been using a
pathway across neighboring land to reach a public street. The homeowner
intends to build an additional apartment to accommodate aging parents. Will
the homeowner know to investigate whether her parents will be entitled to
use the path? Even if the homeowner knows to investigate, how would she
find an answer to her question? She could hire a lawyer to examine her deed
to determine whether she has an express easement to use the pathway, and
to determine the easement's scope. But if the deed says nothing about an
easement, or is silent about the easement's scope, the homeowner, or her
lawyer, will have to investigate further. The lawyer will have to uncover the
origins of the pathway's use to determine whether the homeowner has ac-
quired an implied easement, and if so, what its scope is.
In both of these situations, and in many others that arise in the context of
real property, a potential resource user will not immediately know who owns
the rights the user covets. Indeed, in these situations, the user might believe
that she owns those rights. To discover whether someone else owns the
rights she wants to use requires search and expenditure of resources-even
where legal doctrines are crystal clear.
B. Intellectual Property
Search costs may be even more significant in copyright and patent law."
First, some areas of copyright law are inherently fuzzy even to lawyers with
expertise in the area, let alone to lay users of prior works." Users can
50. For a discussion of the practical problems of determining land boundaries, even with
modem technology, see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J.
2419, 2447-48 (2001).
51. Cf Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession,
100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1071 (2006) (noting that encroachers will make at least an implicit calcu-
lation on "the question of whether it is worth becoming educated about the true state of
ownership"). Fennell goes on to note that the calculation "depends, in part, on the costs associated
with being wrong." Id. Jeffrey Stake has observed that although the technology has reduced the cost
of surveys in recent years, "low-cost surveys are still not a practical reality." Stake, supra note 50, at
2447.
52. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 483-
84 (2004).
53. As Henry Smith has put it, with intellectual property, "'keeping off' is not as easy as in
the case of tangible property." Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Enti-
tlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1782 (2007).
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appropriate non-copyrightable ideas but not copyrighted expression; how-
ever, the line between the two is not clear.5 4 Even when one appropriates
expression, determining whether the appropriation constitutes "fair use"
requires multi-factored analysis.55
Second, even when copyright law provides clear doctrinal answers, a
prospective user of copyrightable work will still face significant search
costs. For example, a user needs to know the date of publication to know
56
whether the work is still protected by copyright. Additionally, a prospective
user needs to identify the current holder of the copyright-not always an
easy matter. Identifying the "author" of a musical composition, or a televi-
sion program may require investigation." Even when one identifies the
original author, tracing potential assignments of the copyright requires addi-
tional search.58
These problems are exacerbated when the potential user of the resource
is not the author of the potentially infringing work. For instance, even if the
author of a novel or a song knows that his composition uses elements of
earlier works, the author has no reason to inform his publisher of the bor-
rowing, and may in fact indicate that the work does not infringe. The
publisher will often find it difficult or impossible to conduct an independent
investigation to determine whether the author's work infringed some aspect
of a copyrighted work. The problem becomes even more pronounced with
vicarious infringers-the bookstore that sells copies of an infringing novel,
or the movie theater that shows a movie that infringes on an earlier work.
6
0
Patent law creates its own set of search costs. By contrast to copyright,
independent creation is not a defense to patent infringement. As a result, a
person who uses an invention or process that might have been patented must
conduct a search to guard against patent infringement claims. 6 ' Because of
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (providing that copyright does not extend to "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery"). For criticism of
the idea/expression doctrine as incoherent, see John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of
Patent, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 119, 121-29 (1991).
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (enumerating four fair-use factors).
56. The current copyright statute protects works for a period measured by the life of the
author plus 70 years, unless the work is anonymous, psueudonymous, or a work made for hire, in
which case the work is protected for 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever expires first. Id. § 302(a), (c). For works produced before 1978, see id. § 303.
57. Id. § 201. Section 201 provides for joint works and works made for hire, terms defined in
section 101, but without sufficient precision to avoid controversies about ownership. Id.
58. Id. § 201(d). Section 201(d) permits transfer of ownership of a copyright (and section
205 provides a recording system for transfers), but section 203 permits the author (or persons who
hold the author's termination interest) to terminate any transfer during a statutory five-year window
period.
59. Reliance on the author's assurances will not insulate the publisher from liability. See De
Acosta v. Brown, 146 E2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding publisher liable for infringement even if
it erroneously relied on assurances of author).
60. Cf Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding operator
of a flea market liable for infringement by vendors participating at flea market).
61. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
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the notorious difficulty in assessing the breadth and coverage of patent
claims, patent searches can be difficult and expensive. Moreover, because
issuance of a patent by the patent office does not establish the validity of the
patent, even an exhaustive search of patent office records will not defini-
62tively establish whether use of an invention constitutes infringement.
C. Search Costs and Efficiency
What attitude should the legal system take toward search costs? First, it
is not always efficient for potential users to engage in a search that defini-
63tively establishes the existence and scope of the owner's legal rights. Even
if we start with the premise that certainty about legal rights has positive
value, increased certainty, like other economic goods, has diminishing mar-
ginal utility. So long as achieving additional certainty is not cost free, there
will inevitably come a point at which it is inefficient to seek additional cer-
tainty.
Second, certainty about legal rights often has limited positive value.
Merrill and Smith have emphasized that clear legal rules are particularly
valuable when contract is not feasible as a mechanism for allocating re-
sources• 4 But when a potential dispute affects only two parties, contract is
available as an allocation mechanism, and parties can and do bargain in theS 65
face of uncertainty. In a Coaseian world, if two parties value the same re-
source, one would expect them, by private bargain, to allocate that resource
to the person who values it most, even if neither party knows who has the
legal right to that resource.66
Consider the problem in a concrete, albeit somewhat stylized, real prop-
erty context. An improver contemplates expanding the building that houses
her business to an area near her boundary line. Let us assume that neither
the improver nor the neighbor knows whether the boundary-line improve-
ment would actually encroach on the neighbor's parcel, and that the parties'
relationship is entirely at arm's length. The expansion reduces the value of
the neighboring parcel. The improver could relocate the improvement away
from the boundary line in a way that avoids any conflict with the neighbor.
62. See infra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
63. Kaplow and Shavell have compared the effect of negligence and strict-liability regimes
on optimal provision of legal advice. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private versus Socially Opti-
mal Provision of ExAnte LegalAdvice, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 307 (1992) (noting the possibility
of divergence between the private and social values of that legal advice).
64. Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 794 (noting that when in personam agreements become
less feasible, an in rem exclusion regime conserves information by "restricting the duties to a short
list of negative obligations, easily defined and understood by all").
65. See generally POSNER, supra note 41, at 553-557 (discussing settlement of disputes in
which liability is unclear).
66. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 24 ("[T]he parties should negotiate to the same welfare-
maximizing allocation of resources they would have agreed on if property rights were certain, dis-
counting the price to reflect the shared perception of the probability of who should pay whom.").
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In this situation, relocating the improvement away from the boundary
line is efficient if the avoidance cost-the reduced value of the relocated
improvement to the improver-is smaller than the reduction in value to the
neighbor that would be caused by the boundary-line improvement. So long
as both parties know the effect the boundary-line improvement has on the
values of the respective parcels, the parties should generally bargain to the
efficient result even if they do not know whether the improvement would
encroach.67 If the improver's avoidance cost is lower than the value to the
neighbor, the improver has little reason to interfere with his neighbor's use,
even if the improver and the neighbor are equally unsure whether the
boundary-line improvement would encroach on the neighbor's rights. The
amount the neighbor will be willing to pay the improver to avoid the bound-
ary-line improvement will depend on the parties' assessment of the
likelihood that the improvement encroaches-but rational bargaining should
nevertheless lead the improver to avoid the boundary-line improvement.68
Moreover, expenditures designed to increase certainty about the respec-
tive rights of the improver and the neighbor will not typically generate
significant positive externalities. Discovering the "true" boundary line be-
tween the parcels owned by the improver and the neighbor will not
generally be of value to owners of other parcels. Search for the true bound-
ary will, in some circumstances, be of value to successors in interest to the
same parcel, but in most cases the value of information produced by the
search degrades quickly.0
In this situation, a search by the improver to determine whether the
boundary-line improvement actually does encroach on the neighbor's land
generates costs without social benefits. The search costs-even if they
amount only to commissioning a survey-do not lead to any efficiency
gains because the parties would have settled on the efficient use even with-
out the search. This conclusion does not mean, however, that the improver
67. James Gibson has noted that in intellectual property cases, parties routinely negotiate
licensing agreements even when it is entirely unclear whether the potential user of the intellectual
work needs to obtain a license. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 890-95 (2007). Gibson is concerned that this tendency has pro-
duced doctrinal feedback that ultimately expands the scope of intellectual property protection. Id. at
898-900.
68. Merrill, supra note 8, at 24.
69. When parties try to create entirely new property rights, they do impose external costs on
potential users of those rights. As a result, legal rules constrain the categories of property rights
parties may create. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 44, at 26-27. But expenditures to determine
whether a particular use would violate an established property right are unlikely to generate compa-
rable external effects.
70. Suppose, for instance, the potential improver's search involves consultation with a law-
yer followed by the commission of a survey. If a successor in interest contemplates a similar (or
different) improvement, the successor will not know of the initial improver's consultation, or of the
information conveyed, and will therefore have to repeat the consultation process. The survey, by
contrast, might be of some value to successors, subject to qualifications: first, as time passes, the
monuments used to mark the survey on the ground (fences, trees, etc.) have a tendency to disappear,
diminishing the survey's value; second, even if the survey itself does not degrade, it will have little
value to a successor in interest unless that successor contemplates an improvement like that contem-
plated by the initial improver.
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has no incentive to commission the survey. The information generated by
the survey might enhance the improver's bargaining position by demonstrat-
ing that the boundary-line improvement does not, in fact, encroach on the
neighbor's land. Thus, the search might generate private gains to the party
incurring the search costs, while generating no comparable social gains.7'
The assumption so far has been that negotiations between the parties
will lead to the efficient use of resources. But negotiations will not inevita-
bly lead to efficient use. Negotiations may fail for a number of reasons,
three of which stand out. First, either party might overestimate the strength
of her legal position.72 In this situation, bargaining might break down, and
the improver might build the boundary-line improvement even though it is
inefficient to do so.7
Second, the potential user of a resource may not know with whom to
negotiate without engaging in some measure of search. In intellectual prop-
erty cases, questions about identity of the potential resource owner will
typically be especially difficult to resolve. Even if a potential user can iden-
tify the original "author" or "inventor" of a particular work, this may reveal
little to the user about how those rights have been assigned or divided over
time.74
Third, the assumption of an arms-length relationship between an osten-
sible owner and a potential improver will not always hold. In the intellectual
property context, the assumption of arms-length dealing appears particularly
realistic, as it does between commercial landowners. But with neighboring
homeowners, preservation of neighborly relations will often be of consider-
able importance both to the improver and the neighboring owner.75 Although
71. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 602-05 (1992) (noting differences between the private and social value of obtaining legal
advice).
72. Merrill, supra note 8, at 24-25; POSNER, supra note 41, at 556.
73. Of course, bargaining might break down for other reasons as well. For instance, the
improver might not be a rational maximizer. That is, if the improver is confident that the improve-
ment does not encroach, the improver may simply proceed with the improvement without seeking to
extract payment from the neighbor to build away from the boundary line. Additional information is
not likely to have significant impact on the improver who is not a rational maximizer.
74. Indeed, in light of the termination provisions in the copyright statute, it is sometimes
impossible to know whose consent will be necessary to secure the rights a potential user wants.
Section 203 to title 17 of the United States Code gives an author an inalienable right to terminate
any copyright assignment. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). That right, however, passes to statutory succes-
sors-who will not be determined until the author's death. As a result, a user who wants to purchase
a long-term right to exploit the copyrighted work may be stymied in doing so. Section 203(b)(1)
does qualify the inalienability provision in one way: if a user prepares a derivative work under au-
thority of a grant before termination, the user may continue to use the derivative work after
termination. Id. This provision avoids the difficulty the Supreme Court faced in Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207 (1990), decided under the renewal provisions that preceded the current termination
provisions. See R. Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives
on Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 727-35 (1995) (explaining how the
1976 Act would prevent the result in Stewart v. Abend).
75. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 95 (1987)
(noting that legal doctrine "suggests a conception of neighbors that includes continuing mutual
dependence rather than a pattern of discrete and unrelated transactions").
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any discussion about boundary-line issues is fraught with potential to rup-
ture a cordial relationship, the problem is particularly serious when the
negotiation proceeds from uncertainty about legal rights.76 Imagine, for in-
stance, a potential improver who approaches her neighbor with the
following basic proposition:
I'd like to expand my driveway along our common boundary. I don't think
the new driveway would encroach, but I can't be sure without commission-
ing a survey. I could just take the small risk of encroachment and build the
driveway, but if the driveway might be harmful to you, pay me half the cost
of a survey and I'll live with a narrower driveway.
Even if the proposition would be in the economic interest of both parties,
narrowly defined, the potential improver might recognize that the offer
would be perceived as insulting-and therefore not worth making.
In each of these situations, a search for information about the parties' re-
spective legal rights could potentially avoid inefficient use of resources, but
the cure should not be worse than the disease: if the problem to be avoided
is inefficient harm to the resource owner, a search whose cost exceeds the
harm would itself be inefficient. Indeed, even when the harm to the neighbor
is inefficient, the harm overstates the measure of the inefficiency. Rather, the
efficiency loss is typically the harm to the neighbor less the cost of avoiding
that harm.
Even in cases where an improvement threatens significant harm to a re-
source owner, search will often be unnecessary to avoid that harm and any
resulting inefficiency. As we have seen, in some percentage of cases, the
parties will negotiate an efficient solution in the absence of search." More
important, in other cases, the prospect of legal liability, as the following il-
lustration shows, may induce a potential resource user to take efficient
action even without search. Let H represent the harm a resource user's ac-
tion will cause to the ostensible resource owner. Let A represent the cost to
the resource owner of avoiding that harm. If legal rules make the resource
user liable for H in cases of encroachment or infringement, the resource
user, absent search, will encroach or infringe whenever A > H. When A > H,
that result appears efficient. But when A < H, a legal rule holding the poten-
tial user liable for H does not guarantee the efficient result, because the
resource user, by hypothesis, is uncertain about whether she will be liable
for the harm she causes. Hence, it may be worth the resource user's while to
take her chances on encroachment. In a significant subset of cases in which
76. The problem is twofold. First, the neighbor may-rightly or wrongly-perceive harm
from the fact of encroachment, without regard to whether the encroachment interferes with any of
the neighbor's prospective uses of her parcel. Hence, the neighbor may be unwilling to evaluate any
deal without knowing whether the improver's use would actually encroach. Second, the fact that the
potential improver professes uncertainty may induce suspicion in the neighbor that the improver has
more information than she is revealing, making the neighbor wary of any deal the improver pro-
poses. This second problem-fear of asymmetric information-is a problem even with arms-length
transactions between commercial parties, but those parties will typically be in a better position to
evaluate the risks involved.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
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A < H, however, legal liability will generate efficient action. Let us assume
that p represents the resource user's estimate of the probability that she will
be liable if she takes a particular action. Then, in cases where A < pH, the
resource user will avoid using the resource even without searching. Hence,
only in cases where pH < A < H does search have the potential to avoid in-
efficient use of the resource.
The combination of private negotiations and legal liability, therefore,
will often avoid inefficiency even when a potential resource user is uncertain
about her legal rights. Hence, if H-A represents the potential inefficiency
generated by a resource user's encroachment on the rights of an ostensible
owner of the resource, H-A significantly overstates the social benefit of a
search that eliminates uncertainty about the scope of legal rights and the
identity of right holders. Because it is difficult to determine how often pri-
vate negotiations or legal liability would generate efficient use of resources
in the absence of search, it may be difficult to determine precisely when
using search to clarify property rights would be efficient. But unless search
generates positive externalities,78 it is certainly inefficient when its cost is
greater than H-A, the maximum inefficiency that search could avoid. What
impact should this insight have on legal doctrine? From an efficiency stand-
point, legal doctrine should encourage search only when the cost of search is
lower than the expected harm-economic and emotional-that the search
will prevent. Conversely, doctrine should discourage search whenever the
cost of the search exceeds the expected harm that the search would prevent.
In major intellectual property or real estate development cases, with high
stakes and sophisticated legal actors, one would expect the parties to re-
spond to incentives created by the legal system. Of course, in a significant
subset of cases involving uncertainty about the scope of legal rights, poten-
tial users who are ignorant about the scope of their rights will be equally
ignorant of the legal sanctions applicable to their behavior. In this subset of
cases, legal doctrine will be incapable of affecting the behavior of potential
resource users. 79 As a result, legal rules designed to discourage inefficient
78. If search would generate significant positive externalities, search might be efficient even
if the cost were greater than H-A. If the disputes requiring search costs were primarily cases in
which abstract legal rules were unclear, the caveat might swallow up the basic thesis. In fact, how-
ever, most of the cases involving high search costs are cases involving difficulty applying legal rules
to particular circumstances. Because of the particularity of the problems, search will not generate
positive externalities. See supra note 69 (discussing search costs in boundary dispute cases).
In copyright cases where the search difficulty is locating the holder of copyright, positive ex-
ternalities will be rare. Other potential users are not likely to discover prior searches, and the
searcher will have little reason to publicize them. When the difficulty involves scope of copyright
protection, so much will depend on the particulars of the allegedly infringing and infringed works
that positive externalities are unlikely to be a significant factor. But cf Gibson, supra note 67, at
887-906 (arguing that the incentive for potential users to negotiate rather than litigate creates a
feedback loop that ultimately contracts the scope of copyright defenses).
Positive externalities may be more common in those patent cases in which search-almost in-
evitably through litigation-establishes the validity or invalidity of a previously issued patent. In
that case, the determination itself has clear value to any potential users of the invention. See Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 87-90 (2005).
79. On legal rules' limited ability to affect behavior, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1699 (1976).
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search will operate only at the margin. But even if doctrine provides limited
feedback to future users, there are good reasons for limiting the liability of
persons who acted reasonably when they failed to incur inefficient search
costs. In particular, applying the same rule to those who would have re-
sponded to legal incentives and those who would not have responded avoids
the difficulty of sorting between the two groups.8 0 The next Part examines
the impact of alternative remedial regimes on resource users' incentive to
search.
III. PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND SEARCH COSTS
Search to determine the scope of one's legal rights has the potential to
produce both social gains and private gains. The social gains, as the preced-
ing Section explains, arise because search can prevent a bargaining
breakdown, which would lead to inefficient use of resources. There is no
guarantee, however, that a resource user who commissions a search will be
able to capture all of the social gains the search might generate; some will
inevitably redound to the benefit of the resource "owner."
Private gains are the benefits search generates for the party who com-
missions the search. Some of those gains arise from the inefficiencies
avoided by the search, but the resource user who conducts a search may also
be able to use the search results to extract concessions from the ostensible
owner of the resource. That is, search may reveal weaknesses in the owner's
claim, which will strengthen the bargaining position of the potential re-
source user.
From an economic standpoint, however, the objective should be to
maximize social gains associated with search. Search is efficient only when
the expected social gains from the search exceed the cost of the search. Po-
tential resource users, however, are not motivated by a desire to maximize
social gains, but, generally, only by a desire to maximize their private gains.
Hence, the closer the legal regime comes to equating the private gains from
search with the social gains, the more effective the regime will be at gener-
ating the efficient level of search.8' The succeeding Sections examine the
private incentives to search under two alternative regimes-a liability-rule
regime and a property-rule regime. The analysis demonstrates that, com-
pared with a liability-rule regime, a property-rule regime creates excessive
incentives to search even when search costs are high, the probability of en-
croachment is relatively low, and the likely harm to the property owner is
low. These are the very circumstances in which search is most likely to be
inefficient.
80. See POSNER, supra note 41, at 167-68 (discussing the administrative costs of sorting
among groups of potential tortfeasors as a reason for embracing the "reasonable man" standard in
tort law).
81. Cf Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (discussing inefficiencies resulting
from divergence of the private and social benefits of engaging in litigation).
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A. Liability Rules
Consider three alternatives available to a potential resource user unsure
about the scope of her right to use the resource: (1) she can use the resource
without further inquiry, (2) she can avoid using the resource, or (3) she can
82
conduct further search before deciding what course to pursue. One might
reasonably assume that the potential user would pursue the alternative that
yields the most favorable expected return.83
Each alternative has a cost. Assume that the user estimates the probabil-
ity that using the resource will generate liability as p. In a liability-rule
regime, if the user simply uses the resource and is found to have infringed,
she will be held liable for H, the dollar value of the harm to the resource84
owner. Hence, the expected cost of the first alternative, using the resource
without further inquiry, is pH.15 The resource user's second alternative-
avoiding use of the resource-also comes at a cost. Assuming use of the
resource is more attractive to the user than the next best alternative, the user
will incur an avoidance cost, A. Absent search, the owner will avoid use of
the resource if A < pH, and will use the resource if A > pH. The total cost
associated with the search alternative is more complex. Search is not a sub-
stitute for using the resource or avoiding use of the resource. Once the
potential user searches, the potential user will have to choose between the
two alternatives. But the results of search may reduce the cost to the poten-
tial user of the two other alternatives.
Search has the potential to reveal information with strategic value to the
potential resource user. For instance, search may reveal that the use does not
infringe on any right of the ostensible owner. In that event, the potential user
will at a minimum be able to escape any avoidance costs. Beyond that, how-
ever, the potential user, armed with the results of the search, might be able
to induce the ostensible owner-who, it turns out, is not an owner after all-
to pay the resource user not to use the resource.
The resource user will search when the expected private benefits of
search exceed the cost of the search. Put in other terms, the resource user
82. In fact, the potential user faces a fourth alternative: negotiate with the ostensible owner
without engaging in any search to discover the scope of their respective legal rights. For clarity of
exposition, that alternative is discussed in Section IU.C, infra.
83. The analysis assumes risk-neutral potential users. Risk-averse users would be less likely
to use without searching.
84. The analysis assumes that the potential resource user can arrive at an estimate of H with-
out incurring significant search costs. For discussion of incentives to obtain legal advice about how
courts will determine the amount of harm suffered by a victim, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note
63, at 306-20.
85. The assumption here is that the potential user derives no value from preservation of a
harmonious relationship with the ostensible owner, and therefore is not harmed by actions that
threaten that relationship. If the model incorporated harm to the relationship, the analysis would be
similar if we assume that the potential user would suffer harm to the relationship only if her actions
would actually intrude upon a right of the ostensible owner. On that assumption, pH would capture
the harm to the potential user so long as H were defined to include harm to the relationship. If, how-
ever, the potential user's actions would harm the relationship regardless of whether those actions
interfere with the ostensible owner's legal rights, the analysis would become more complicated.
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will search when the out-of-pocket costs of the search, together with the
expected costs associated with the outcomes revealed by the search, are
86
smaller than the lesser of pH and A.
In a liability-rule regime, this calculus presents potential users with a
considerable incentive to search. Consider first the situation in which pH <
A < H. In this situation, search has the potential to generate social benefit:
search might cause the potential user to incur avoidance cost, A, rather than
using without search. Because a liability rule presents the resource user with
a risk of liability for H if the user does not search, the liability rule encour-
ages the user to search when the cost of search is low relative to the
probability of liability and the inefficiency avoided by search.
Consider the private calculus of a potential owner considering a search.
Let S reflect the out-of-pocket cost to a potential user of the search neces-
sary to clarify her legal position. The user knows that if she conducts the
search, she will face avoidance costs, A, with probability p, but no costs with
probability I-p. Moreover, if search reveals no liability, the user faces poten-
tial gains from trade with the ostensible owner, who will want to avoid
harm, H. We can reasonably assume that, on average, the parties will divide
those gains from trade equally."
In that event, the total cost is captured by the following:
S + pA - (1-p)(I/2)(H-A)
The resource user will undertake this cost when it is smaller than the
cost of her next best alternative-using the resource without further investi-
gation-which, by hypothesis, has a cost of pH. Hence the user will search
only if
S + pA - (1-p)(1/2)(H-A) < pH
which reduces to
S < (1/2)(I+p)(H-A).
If the only three alternatives available to the potential user were to harm
without search, to avoid harm, and to search, this inequality would suggest
that a liability rule generates too few incentives to search. When H-A > S >
(1/2)(I+p)(H-A), the potential user would harm without search even though
search would generally lead to avoidance, a more efficient alternative. But
this analysis ignores a fourth alternative available to the potential improver:
86. The baseline assumption of the model is that the potential user has an unquestioned right
to use the resource without incurring any liability to the ostensible owner. Against that baseline,
each alternative-search, use without search, and avoidance-leaves the user worse off. The model,
therefore, considers how much worse off the potential user would be with each alternative. Each
alternative presents different costs. It would, of course, be possible to use a different baseline with-
out changing the comparative advantages of the alternatives open to the potential user.
87. John Nash developed a model predicting equal division of gains from trade in cases
where each party would receive nothing in the absence of agreement. See John F. Nash, Jr., The
Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 157-62 (1950). For a more recent discussion, see
Gideon Parchomovsky et al., Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 761-63
(2007).
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negotiation with the ostensible owner against a background of uncertainty.
When S > (1/2)(I+p)(H-A), this fourth alternative will often generate more
private benefit for the potential resource user than will the other three alter-
natives, and, at the same time, entail fewer social costs than will search 8
The negotiation alternative, then, significantly mitigates the possibility that
liability rules create too few incentives for efficient search, because its avail-
ability reduces the number of circumstances in which search would be
efficient. s9
Liability rules are more likely to result in inefficient searches when A <
pH. In this situation, any search would be inefficient because the search will
generate no social benefit. Absent search, the potential resource user will
avoid using the resource rather than take the chance of incurring liability
because avoidance is cheaper than the expected liability. Hence, the socially
optimal result would be achieved without search. Nevertheless, if search is
sufficiently inexpensive, the resource user in a liability-rule regime will
conduct a search because the search might generate private benefits: it might
reveal that the resource user's prospective use does not infringe, giving the
resource user leverage to extract payment from the ostensible owner.90
88. This is especially true when the parties share a common understanding of H and A, and
where the parties share a common estimate of p. In that situation, the parties both have an incentive
to divide the gains from trade, with payment running from ostensible owner to potential user in
order to defray the user's avoidance costs.
89. At the same time, in circumstances under which the potential user's estimate of p is
lower than she expects the ostensible owner's estimate to be, the potential user in a liability-rule
regime may derive strategic advantages from searching even when negotiations without search
would be a more efficient alternative.
Thus, the potential user who believes the owner is overestimating his prospect of success may
conduct a search to persuade the owner to make a larger payment than the owner would otherwise
be inclined to make. For instance, suppose H = 16, A = 10, and the resource user's estimate of p is
.4, but the owner's estimate is .5. In that circumstance, the ostensible owner believes that the re-
source user's use of the resource will inflict an expected harm of 8, considering a 50% likelihood
that the owner would receive compensation (.5 x 16). Although the ostensible owner would be will-
ing to pay up to 8 to persuade the user to avoid that harm, the owner would probably not want to see
the resource user reap all of the gains from trade, and would therefore expect to pay an amount
closer to 5, which would evenly divide the gains from trade as a result of avoidance. In this situa-
tion, if search costs are relatively low, the resource user will find it worthwhile to search as a means
of increasing the ostensible owner's offer.
90. Consider the calculus facing a resource user contemplating search as an option where A
= $300, H = $500, and p = .8. Search in this situation may be inefficient: If the user in this situation
conducts a search, she will incur the cost of the search S. If the user searches, the .8 probability of
liability will clarify into either 0% or 100% chance of liability. If the search confirms the existence
and identity of an owner with a right to the disputed resource, the resource user will then incur the
avoidance cost of $300 because it is cheaper than the certain liability of $500. If, on the other hand,
the search reveals that the resource user can use the resource without incurring liability, she could
use the resource and avoid further cost. Additionally, the resource user will often-but not always-
be able to offset some of the cost of the search by extracting payment from the ostensible owner.
The user could approach the ostensible owner-who would suffer $500 harm upon use of the re-
source by the user-and agree to avoid using the resource in return for a payment of between $300
and $500. The ostensible owner, confronted with proof that she cannot hold the resource user liable
for using the resource, will find it in her interest to pay in order to avoid $500 in harm.
Let us assume that the user and the ostensible owner would split these gains from trade evenly
so that the ostensible owner would pay $400 if the user agrees to avoid using the resource. In that
event, so long as search costs are lower than $80, the potential user has an incentive to search. If the
user pays, for instance, $50, the user will face an 80% chance that the search will generate liability,
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That liability rules sometimes generate incentives to conduct inefficient
searches is not critical to my thesis; in similar circumstances, property rules
will also generate inefficient searches. The more important point is that in
an important class of cases-those where A > H-liability rules avoid in-
centives to conduct inefficient searches.
When avoidance costs are greater than the harm to the ostensible owner,
search about the scope of the user's rights will never generate social bene-
fits, because the efficient result is for the user to use the resource-precisely
the course the user will take if the user does not conduct a search. The
search, then, adds no social value.
In a liability-rule regime, the user has no incentive to search in this
situation. The user's best alternative to search is simply to use the resource,
which costs the user pH. The user will only search if the search alternative
will generate a total cost less than pH. The only cost the user avoids by
searching is pH, so the user would have no reason to invest more than pH in
the search process. But the expected cost to the user of the search alternative
is S + pH. That is, if the user decides to search, the user will incur the out-
of-pocket cost of search, S, and then will face two alternatives, depending on
what the search reveals. With probability p, the search will reveal that the
prospective use infringes. Because A > H, the user's best alternative is to use
the resource anyway, which would generate damages of H. If the search re-
veals that the prospective use does not infringe, the user will incur no further
costs, but will also derive no benefits from negotiating with the owner, be-
cause using the right will not cause enough harm to the owner to make it
worth the owner's right to pay avoidance costs. Hence, the user will search
only when S + pH < pH, or, put in other terms, where S < 0. As a result,
search costs will never be worth undertaking-the efficient result.
B. Property Rules
The preceding Section demonstrates that a liability-rule regime creates
more than adequate private incentives for search. Now let us turn to the im-
pact of a property-rule regime on incentives to search.
The potential resource user in a property-rule regime faces the same al-
ternatives the user would face in a liability-rule regime: (1) use the resource
without investigating ownership rights, (2) avoid using the resource, or (3)
search for information about ownership rights. Using the resource without
search, however, is much less attractive in a property-rule regime because
the cost to the resource user will be much higher if it turns out that the user
has infringed. Moreover, in a property-rule regime, that cost is not necessar-
ily related to actual harm. Instead the user's cost is capped only by the cost
in which case the user will pay the avoidance costs, and a 20% chance of no liability, in which case
the user would receive a benefit of $ 100-the difference between the $400 payment from the osten-
sible owner and the $300 avoidance cost. As a result, the total expected cost for the owner who
searches would be $50 + (.8 x $300) - (.2 x $100) = $270. That total is less than the $300 in avoid-
ance cost, which represents the user's next best alternative. Hence, the user will search, in this case,
even though the cost of the search exceeds its social benefit.
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of undoing the infringement-which can be extraordinarily high, particu-
larly in complex intellectual property cases. As a result, the potential user
has a greater incentive to choose one of the other alternatives: avoidance or
search. As the following analysis demonstrates, in a significant number of
cases, the potential user's best choice will be to engage in inefficient
searches that would be avoided in a liability-rule regime.
In a liability-rule regime, the cost of using the resource without investi-
gating the parties' respective rights is pH. By contrast, in a property-rule
regime, the user must worry about the prospect of an injunction that requires
her to remove any encroachment or infringement. A more modest assump-
tion-consistent with the assumptions made so far-is that the owner would
not actually force removal of the encroachment in those cases where the cost
of removal is greater than the harm to the owner, but would use the leverage
of injunctive relief to extract a sum from the user that is higher than is the
harm actually suffered by the owner. Assume, as before, that the parties will
divide gains from trade equally. On that assumption, the maximum cost fac-
ing the user is p(H + (1/2)(R-H)) where R is the cost of removal.
Simplifying, the cost facing the user is (1/2)p(R+H), which is always higher
than pH, and which becomes significantly higher as R rises.
In those situations where A < pH, substituting a property rule for a li-
ability rule will have no impact on the potential resource user's calculations.
In either regime, the potential user will balance the costs and benefits of
search against avoidance cost, because avoidance is the user's next best al-
ternative. As previously discussed, the user will search whenever S + pA -
(1-p)(1/2)(H-A) < A. None of these factors change with transition from a
liability-rule regime to a property-rule regime.
In other situations, however, property rules create incentives to conduct
inefficient searches that potential resource users would not conduct in a li-
ability-rule regime. Where pH < A < H, a potential resource user in a
liability-rule regime would balance the costs and benefits of search against
pH because using without further search would be the user's next best alter-
native. In a property-rule regime, however, pH is irrelevant to the user. If the
user uses without search, the user's expected cost is (1/2)p(R + H). Hence,
the user will balance the costs and benefits of search against the lesser of A
and (1/2)p(R + H). This shift in calculus will generate significantly more
searches. Moreover, those searches are likely to be inefficient, because the
increased impetus to search will have no relationship to the harm caused by
using the resource. Instead, the increased impetus to search will be gener-
ated entirely by the fear of removal costs.9'
Suppose, for instance, that use of a resource will harm the ostensible
owner of the resource by $500, and that the probability of liability to that
owner is forty percent. Suppose further that the user's avoidance costs are
91. The shift in calculus will, however, generate one efficiency advantage unrelated to
search: it will increase the number of cases in which the user's default position-the position in case
of bargaining breakdown-will be avoidance rather than using the resource without further search.
Because, by hypothesis, A < H, the result will be fewer inefficient uses of the resource. The signifi-
cance of this advantage depends on the expected frequency of bargaining breakdown.
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$300, and that the user's removal costs after using without permission would
be $900. The search will reveal one of two outcomes: either the ostensible
owner owns the resource, in which case the user will bear a cost of A, or the
ostensible owner does not own the resource, in which case the user will have
the opportunity to extract payment in exchange for a promise not to cause
harm to the ostensible owner.92 Hence, the total cost associated with the
search alternative is S + pA - (1/2)(1-p)(H-A). In the hypothetical, the cost
associated with the search alternative is, therefore S + 60. In the liability-
rule regime, then, the user will search only when S + 60 < 200 (because pH
= 200). But in a property-rule regime, the user will search whenever S + 60
< 280 (because (1/2)p(R + H) = 280). Hence, in a property-rule regime, the
user will search when S < $220, while in a liability-rule regime, the user
would search much less frequently, only when S < $140. The problem from
a social efficiency standpoint is that the user's incentive to search increases
as R increases, even though R has no relationship to the efficiency of the
resource's use.
Finally, consider the situation where A > H. As we have seen, in a liabil-
ity-rule regime, the potential user of a resource has no incentive to search in
this case, because search will generate no relevant information: whatever the
result of the search, the user's best alternative is to use the resource-the
efficient result. In a property-rule regime, by contrast, the user does have an
incentive to search, because even if A > H, avoidance may still be the
cheapest alternative to search if A < (1/2)p(R + H). This will be especially
likely when removal costs are high.93
92. This type of transaction is typically available when the potential users of the resource are
limited in number, as is typically the case in real property situations involving boundary disputes or
easement scope. The parties could structure the transaction to transfer rights-either a fee interest or
a servitude-from the lower-valuing user to the higher-valuing user in return for a payment of
money.
As Kaplow and Shavell have noted, transactions like these will be more problematic when the
number of potential users is high. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 765-66. In those cases, the
high-valuing user will be reluctant to part with money because another potential user could instantly
begin to cause the same harm.
Thus, in some, but not all, intellectual property transactions, negotiations like these will be dif-
ficult to arrange. For instance, if a potential user's search were to reveal that the invention the user
wants to use was never patented, or that the patent was invalid, the initial inventor would find it
unwise to pay the potential user not to use the invention-even if the inventor is the highest-valuing
user-because another potential user might come along and make precisely the same use, causing
the same harm.
On the other hand, if the question is not whether the original inventor (or author) held a prop-
erty right in the work, but rather whether the user's work constitutes infringement, there is more
room for negotiation. In that case, the user may acquire patent or copyright protection in the user's
invention or work of authorship, and the original inventor might then take an assignment of that
patent or copyright-providing protection against similar uses by other potential users.
When the number of potentiaf users makes structuring an arrangement difficult, search will
have less potential value to the parties.
93. By contrast, when A > (1/2)p(R + H), search will not present any advantage to the poten-
tial user, because use without search will remain the best alternative for the user regardless of the
results of the search. No information revealed by the search will induce the owner to pay the user to
avoid rather than cause harm.
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As a result, the potential user will balance search costs against avoid-
ance costs. Because the consequences of using without search can be so
draconian, the user will often be willing to undertake an expensive search
even when the probability of liability is very low. The potential user, there-
fore, will search whenever S + pA < A, or in other terms, whenever S < (1-
p) A. Thus, the basic point is that adoption of a property-rule regime gener-
ates inefficient searches in this situation-searches that would be avoided in
94
a liability-rule regime.
C. The Impact of Pre-Search Negotiations
In exploring the incentives for inefficient search generated by a property
rules regime, the analysis so far has assumed that the potential resource user
faces three alternatives: use without further inquiry, avoidance, and search.
In fact, however, the user sometimes has a fourth alternative: negotiation
with the ostensible owner before conducting a search for clarity about the
scope of her legal rights. This section demonstrates that the negotiation al-
ternative operates to reduce, but not eliminate, the incentive to inefficient
search generated by a property-rule regime. First, the option to negotiate
without search will be unavailable in those cases where search is necessary
to identify the persons with whom the potential user would need to negoti-
ate.95 Hence, the alternative of negotiation without search is feasible only
when the uncertainty pertains to the scope of the parties' rights, not the iden-
tity of the right holder. But even when the uncertainty involves the scope of
rights, and negotiation is at least theoretically plausible, the strategic posi-
tions of the parties will often make negotiation a less attractive alternative
than inefficient search. For clarity, this section considers separately situa-
tions in which A < H and those in which H < A.
1.A<H
Recall that the user's alternatives-other than search and negotiation-
are to avoid use of the resource or to use the resource without permission.
Suppose avoidance is the more attractive of these two alternatives; that is,
suppose A < (1/2)p(R + H). We then have two alternatives: either A < H <
(1/2)p(R + H) or A < (1/2)p(R + H) < H. If A < H < (1/2)p(R +H), the po-
tential user is better off avoiding than using without search. The ostensible
owner, by contrast, is better off if the user uses without search. The potential
user, therefore, cannot credibly threaten to use if the ostensible owner does
not pay the user to avoid because the ostensible owner would be delighted if
94. Moreover, in this situation, adoption of a property-rule regime creates another ineffi-
ciency independent of search costs: it ensures that in cases of bargaining breakdown, the user's
default position is to avoid use rather than employ the more efficient alternative of using the re-
source regardless of permission.
95. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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the user followed through on the threat. As a result, there is no room for
negotiation. If A < (1/2)p(R + H) < H, there is some room for negotiation,
but not much. The potential user could threaten to use without search, which
would make the ostensible owner worse off than if the user avoided using
the resource. But the owner would have to believe that threat, which would
make the potential user worse off than if the user simply avoided. Assuming
the parties do not have repeated dealings with one another, there is consider-
able risk that the owner will not regard the threat as credible, making
negotiations unsuccessful. Furthermore, if the prospect of successful nego-
tiations is small, the user will not find it worthwhile to incur the cost of
negotiation rather than simply avoiding use of the resource. Especially if the
difference between A and (1/2)p(R + H) is significant, negotiation is not
likely to displace avoidance or search as the potential user's preferred alter-
native.
By contrast, there is more incentive for the potential user to negotiate
when using the resource without permission is a better alternative than
avoiding use, that is, when H > A > (1/2)p(R + H). In this situation, because
injunctive relief is not likely to be draconian, the potential user would be
better off using the resource, and inflicting harm on the owner, unless the
user receives payment equal to at least A - (1/2)p(R + H). The owner, on the
other hand, will find it worthwhile to make a payment of up to H - (1/2)p(R
+ H), leaving room for negotiation between the parties. Of course, if the
potential user searches and discovers that the ostensible owner has no right
to the disputed resource, the potential user might be able to negotiate an
even more favorable deal. Whether search or negotiation is the more attrac-
tive alternative is a function of the cost of search, the cost of negotiation, the
probability of liability, and the relative values of A, H, and R. But there will
remain cases in which a search, though socially inefficient, nevertheless
yields the potential user a better private return than avoidance, use without
search, or negotiation.
2. A>H
In this situation, too, the potential resource user might seek to negotiate
without search. Here, the user might seek to buy the right to harm the
neighbor, because the harm to the neighbor is smaller than the potential
user's avoidance cost (which, by hypothesis, is smaller than the expected
cost of using the resource without search or negotiation). Assuming the par-
ties evenly split the gains from trade, the cost to the potential user will be
(1/2)(A + H), an alternative that is superior to incurring the cost of avoid-
ance when A > H.97 Indeed, this result is rampant in intellectual property
96. Conversely, the ostensible owner will not sell the right to use the resource to the user
because the right to use the resource is only worth A to the user, while use of the resource would
cause harm H to the ostensible owner. Because, by hypothesis, H > A, no bargain would be struck.
97. Note that in this situation, the probability of liability does not affect the amount the user
will pay in negotiations. Cf Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
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cases, where prospective users negotiate licenses even though their use may
not infringe on any right held by the ostensible owner.98
Thus, when A > H, the negotiation alternative reduces, but does not
eliminate, the potential for inefficient search created by the property-rule
regime. The relative advantage of the two alternatives varies with the cost of
search and the probability of liability without search. But when the probabil-
ity of liability is low, the user is likely to find search more attractive than
negotiation.
D. Liability Rules for "Innocent" Encroachers
Although, compared with a property-rule regime, a pure liability-rule
regime reduces incentives to conduct inefficient searches, that advantage
comes at a high price: loss of all protection for subjective value, together
with increased need for judicial assessment of damages in every encroach-
ment case. A critical question, then, is how best to combine the search cost
advantages of a liability-rule regime with the other efficiencies associated
with property rules.
Consider, then, a regime that applies a liability rule only when en-
croachment is "innocent." Assessing such a regime first requires a definition
of innocence. If innocence means absence of actual knowledge, a rule sub-
jecting innocent encroachers to liability rules while non-innocent
encroachers remain subject to property rules would embroil courts in diffi-
cult assessments about the user's actual knowledge,'0° while simultaneously
creating perverse incentives not to search-even when search costs are low.
Defining an innocent encroacher as one who encroaches when search
would have been unreasonable avoids this problem of perverse incentives.
But this definition, too, generates problems. First, should reasonable
searches be equated with efficient searches? Even if the answer were yes,
whether a search would be efficient is not always clear.0 ' Second, a rule that
85 TEx. L. REV. 1991, 2004-05 (2007) (reaching a similar conclusion about pre-infringement nego-
tiations in the patent context).
98. See Gibson, supra note 67, at 887.
99. The expected cost of search to the potential user will be S + pA, while the expected cost
of negotiation without search (if we ignore the cost of negotiation) will be (1/2)(A + H). Hence, the
potential user will search rather than negotiating when S + pA < (I/2)(A + H) or when S < (I/2)(A
+ H) - pA. As p rises, the inequality becomes less likely to hold. Similarly, as S rises, the inequality
becomes less likely to hold.
100. For discussion of the difficulties of a rule that focuses on actual knowledge in the re-
cording act context, see Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded
Transferees of Real Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording System and Their Conse-
quences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 164-68 (1988). The difficulty of proving state of mind also arises
in discussion of adverse possession standards. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and
Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 339 (1983). And in patent litigation, where a finding of
willful infringement can lead to treble damages, one recent empirical study concludes that more
than ninety percent of infringement claims include allegations of willfulness. Kimberly A. Moore,
Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 232 (2004). Moreover,
these claims are never decided on summary judgment motions. Id. at 234.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71.
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requires courts to evaluate the reasonableness of a decision not to search
creates judicial-determination costs unnecessary in a pure liability-rule re-
gime or in a property-rule regime. Third, because a reasonableness regime
introduces a new element of uncertainty into the calculus facing the poten-
tial user, the user has to incorporate into her calculations the possibility that
she will face injunctive relief if she encroaches-generating incentives to
search absent in a pure liability-rule regime.
The more clarity courts can give to reasonableness, the more a potential
user's incentives in a qualified liability-rule regime would approximate
those described in a pure liability-rule regime. But even a relatively muddy
reasonableness rule would reduce the expected cost to a potential user of
using a resource without search, and would therefore reduce, to some de-
gree, the incidence of inefficient searches.
E. Property Rules and Liability Rules: Impact on Owner Behavior
The preceding Sections establish that property rules encourage potential
resource users to search for information about the scope of property rights in
some cases where liability rules would, instead, encourage those users to
make decisions without incurring the same expenditures on information.
The analysis also suggests that the additional incentives to search will not
generate efficiency gains commensurate with the costs of search.
The choice between liability rules and property rules, has the potential
to affect not only the behavior of potential resource users, but also the be-
havior of resource owners. In particular, in a regime of liability rules,
owners might increase the expenditures they make to demarcate their rights
in a way that protects against encroachment.'O For instance, in the case of
real property, owners might expend money on surveying and fencing off
their boundaries. In the case of intellectual property, owners might make
additional efforts to publicize their rights and identity to potential users.
Would these additional expenditures on "marking off" negate any efficiency
gains generated by the smaller number of searches potential resource users
would make in a regime of liability rules? The answer is no. If, even after
marking off, the owner were limited to liability-rule protection, then the
owner would have no reason to expend resources marking off. But even if an
owner who effectively marks off her rights becomes entitled to property-rule
protection against encroachers, owners will have incentives to mark off only
when marking off generates efficiency gains.
' 3
In a liability-rule regime, an owner has no incentive to mark off her
property unless she attaches subjective value to the property which exceeds
the cost of marking off. Liability rules will assure her of the market value of
102. Cf Smith, supra note 4, at 1785-90 (discussing the potential that liability rules will
induce owners to engage in inefficient self-help).
103. An owner who marks off would certainly be entitled to property-rule protection in a
regime that applies liability rules only to innocent encroachers. See supra Section IH.D. In such a
regime, a potential user who encroaches after the owner has marked off a right will have acted un-
reasonably, disqualifying the user from application of liability rules.
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any property on which a potential user encroaches. ' 4 And marking off will
have no strategic value. Suppose an owner who marks off her rights would
be entitled to enjoin encroaching users. If a user did encroach, the owner
would then be entitled to extract removal costs-which might be higher than
the owner's subjective value. But the very act of marking off signals to the
potential user that the user will be subject to injunctive relief-which, in
turn, will eliminate the incentive to encroach. In other words, unlike poten-
tial users who may have strategic incentives to search even when the cost of
search exceeds the social value generated by the search, owners have no
incentive to mark off unless the subjective value the owner attaches to the
property exceeds the cost of marking off.
The remaining question is whether the social value protected by marking
off-the subjective value the owner attaches to her property rights-would
be protected more cheaply by embracing a property rule that creates incen-
tives for potential users to search. There are two strong reasons to believe,
however, that the owner-not the potential user-will be the cheapest cost
avoider when search costs are high even if the costs of marking off are also
high.
First, an owner who marks off property rights provides information to
the universe of potential users. For instance, if marking off constitutes ear-
lier public notice of a patent claim, all potential users benefit from that
notice. By contrast, a potential user who searches to determine the scope of
property rights benefits only herself and has little incentive to reveal that
information to other potential users of the resource. As a result, the informa-
tion generated by a search is likely to be of considerably less value than the
information generated by marking off.
Second, in contrast to a liability-rule regime where owners will only
mark off rights in those cases where they actually attach subjective value to
their rights, a property-rule regime generates increased incentives for all
users to search. The incentives do not depend on the existence of subjective
value because the potential user will not typically know whether a particular
owner attaches subjective value to her right. The potential user in a prop-
erty-rule regime responds not to actual subjective value, but to the potential
for injunctive relief, which will provide leverage even to owners who attach
little or no subjective value to their rights. As a result, a regime that
104. Indeed, even when subjective value exceeds the cost of marking off, it is far from certain
that the owner will expend resources marking off.
First, marking off will be feasible only if the owner knows, or can ascertain at relatively low
cost, the scope of her own property rights with respect to potential users. Suppose, for instance, the
owner's subjective value is SV and the marking off costs are M. If search costs approach SV-M, the
owner will not find it worthwhile to search or mark off, because the owner will only be able to ob-
tain SV by expending both search costs and marking off costs.
Second, there is some probability that even if the owner' does not mark off, no one will en-
croach because the prospect of money damages will be sufficient to prevent encroachment. As a
result, even when SV > M and search costs are low, the owner may find it worthwhile to take the risk
of encroachment-and consequent loss of subjective value-when the probability of encroachment
is significantly less than one.
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encourages owners to mark off is likely to protect subjective value at lower
cost than a regime that provides incentives for potential users to search.
F. A "No-Liability" Rule
The discussion of property rules and liability rules has ignored a third
alternative: impose no liability against an improver who encroached on a
property right after "reasonably" deciding not to search. This approach en-
counters an immediate disadvantage in that it appears inconsistent with any
notion of property rights because it leaves an "owner" with no recourse
against an encroacher.
But the approach is not without legal foundation. In fact, it serves as the
basis for negligence liability in tort law. If a person's actions cause harm to
another's bodily integrity or personal property, but the person did not cause
that harm intentionally or negligently, the person is not liable-regardless of
the severity of the harm. That is the implication of the famous Learned Hand
formula: "if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B
< p L .
' ' 1 5
Debate over the relative efficiencies of a negligence regime and a strict
liability regime is ongoing in tort law scholarship. By contrast, neither prop-
erty doctrine nor property scholarship has ever seriously considered
implementing a negligence-based regime. °6
Consider the impact of a negligence-like approach to the encroachment
problem. Suppose a property owner were entitled to damages, or even in-
junctive relief, in cases where failure to search led to encroachment, but
only when encroachment without search was "unreasonable." The reason-
ableness principle embodied in the Learned Hand formula is that an actor
who engages in efficient behavior should not be liable for injury caused by
that behavior. In the encroachment context, imagine the principle's most
appealing application: a rule that absolves an encroacher of liability when
the encroacher can prove that the harm she caused was smaller than first, the
cost of avoiding that harm, and second, the cost of search necessary to de-
termine the existence and identity of a property owner entitled to prevent the
harm.
As we have seen, when these two conditions, H < A and H < S, are sat-
isfied, property-rule protection of the property owner has the potential to
generate inefficient search, while liability-rule protection will tend to gener-
ate efficient resource use. But a rule of no liability also leads to efficient
resource use because it would prompt potential users to use without search
105. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (emphasis added).
106. Intellectual property scholarship, however, has begun to engage in debate about whether
liability should be imposed on nonwillful infringers. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent In-
fringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MiCH. L. REV. 1525 (2007); R. Anthony Reese,
Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007); Sam-
son Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475
(2006).
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or avoidance when that is clearly the efficient result, without having any
impact on the user's incentives when the two conditions are not met.1
0 7
There are, nevertheless, reasons to prefer a liability rule to a rule of no
liability. First, a no-liability rule would require courts to determine the user's
avoidance costs and search costs-computations that would be unnecessary
in a regime of liability rules.'0 8 But the judicial burdens of making those de-
terminations would be partially offset by the fact that in a no-liability
regime, courts would not have to answer one potentially difficult question:
did the user's actions encroach on the owner's property rights? In a regime
of no liability, ownership would play a subordinate role to the principal de-
termination of reasonableness.
Subordination of the ownership determination, however, may be the
principal weakness of a no-liability regime. Reducing the importance of
ownership threatens to generate at least two related inefficiencies. First, a
no-liability rule creates incentives for the owner to engage in wasteful ex-
penditures designed to monitor her property, or to mark off her property in
order to protect against encroachment.'09 By contrast to a liability-rule re-
gime,' 0 in a no-liability regime, an owner has an incentive to mark off the
property even when marking off generates no social benefit. In a no-liability
regime, failure to mark off would result not merely in the owner's loss of
subjective value, but also in a transfer of market value from the owner to the
encroaching user. As a result, the owner in a no-liability regime would have
an incentive to mark off to avoid that redistribution to the potential user-
even when the redistribution would generate no efficiency gains. " '
107. Cf Alvin K. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 914 (1985) (noting that both strict liability and negligence would induce effi-
cient behavior on assumptions analogous to those applicable here). Professors Kaplow and Shavell
have identified the incentive to obtain information about the appropriate level of care a potential
actor should take as an inefficiency of a negligence regime. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 63, at
316. But a rule that absolves an actor from liability when the actor fails to conduct an inefficient
search for information is hardly likely to induce actors to seek additional information.
108. It is true, however, that courts might have to determine search costs in a regime that
provided liability-rule protection when search costs are higher than H-A, but property-rule protec-
tion in other cases.
109. Cf Smith, supra note 4, at 1730 (noting incentive of owners to engage in costly self-help,
including erection of fences, when legal rules provide inadequate protections).
110. See supra text accompanying note 131.
111. The tort literature has long recognized that a rule absolving an actor of liability creates
an incentive for potential victims to take precautions against harm the actor might cause. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 41, at 169-70; Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1058 (1972). But the potential tort victim who takes precau-
tions does not interfere with the efficiency-promoting activity of the harm-producing actor. Consider
a permutation of the example used by Posner (and derived from Coase) where a railroad could avoid
$100 in damage to a farmer's crops by expending $150 in greater care. POSNER, supra note 41, at
49-50; see also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Learned
Hand formula would absolve the railroad from liability and shift to the farmer the incentive to take
precautions against harm-perhaps by planting flame-resistant crops. Note, however, that any ex-
penditure on flame-resistant crops that generates private benefit to the farmer also generates social
benefit in the form of more undamaged crops; the expenditure does not prevent the railroad from
operating in a way that generates more benefit than cost.
1317May 2008]
Michigan Law Review
A second inefficiency generated by a no-liability rule is the reduced in-
centive to invest in a resource whose ownership is uncertain. Property rights
concentrate the costs and benefits of decisions about a resource in the
owner."2 Liability-rule regimes reduce that concentration to some degree,
but a no-liability regime introduces elements of a rule of capture, with its
attendant inefficiencies. 1
3
Even if a liability rule and a no-liability rule were equally effective in
reducing the incidence of inefficient search, there are still strong reasons to
reject a no-liability rule, even when the potential user of the resource acted
reasonably in using the resource without first ascertaining the scope of her
legal rights.
G. Implications
The analysis strongly suggests that a property-rule regime is likely to
generate inefficient searches that may be avoided in a liability-rule regime.
That is, in a property-rule regime, more potential users will engage in
searches when the social benefits of search do not justify their cost.
This conclusion, however, does not justify jettisoning property rules.
The advantages of property rules are often compelling in the common case
in which search costs are low, or are not an issue at all. Moreover, even in
cases where search costs might be significant-the focus of my analysis-I
have assumed that the harm that resource use would cause for the ostensible
owner is known to the resource user. That assumption is often unrealistic.
Determinations of subjective harm tend to be unreliable. One of the prime
advantages of a property-rule regime is that it induces potential resource
users to account for the subjective harm to the owner-a factor almost nec-
essarily ignored in a liability-rule regime."
4
These obvious advantages of property-rule regimes should not, however,
obscure two basic facts: first, the search for legal clarity is often inefficient;
second, legal rules-and particularly property rules-have the potential to
By contrast, in the typical encroachment case-whether in the real property context or in the
intellectual property context-monitoring or "fencing in" expenditures would not only protect the
owner, but would increase the cost to a potential user seeking to engage in value-enhancing behav-
ior. Lee Anne Fennell has made a similar point in explaining why the law does not absolutely
prohibit landowners from taking actions that have negative impact on neighboring land:
Each time the law decides to enjoin an activity with extra-boundary impacts, it drains away a
property owner's privilege to engage in the activity in question- As more and more uses are
drained away from a given parcel of property, the less use-content remains that would give
ownership of that parcel value.
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1440 (2007).
112. For the seminal statement of this point, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Prop-
erty Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REV. 347, 354-55 (1967); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 1754-56.
113. A rule of capture creates, in effect, a race to use valuable rights, which tends toward
inefficiency because various contestants may expend resources during the race, but only the winner
of the race derives any benefit from those expenditures. See generally Terry L. Anderson & Peter J.
Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L. & ECON. 177 (1990).
114. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1092.
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create incentives for inefficient search for greater legal clarity. Moreover,
when property law rules create incentives for inefficient search, they simul-
taneously impose sanctions on persons who, correctly, abstain from
engaging in socially inefficient searches.
The challenge for legal doctrine, then, is to determine how to reduce in-
centives for inefficient search without undermining the advantages of
property law rules. Search is likely to be inefficient where search costs are
high, where the probability of encroachment is significantly less than one,
and where the harm to the property owner is low (and hence, any ineffi-
ciency avoided by search is likely to be low). When those conditions are
met, doctrine can and should consider substituting liability rules for prop-
erty rules in order to reduce the incentive to search, and to mitigate the
sanctions associated with inefficient search. The next Part demonstrates that,
as a descriptive matter, doctrinal rules often operate-although rarely ex-
plicitly-to account for the inefficiencies of excessive search.
IV. DOCTRINAL TREATMENT OF SEARCH COSTS
When copyright and patent infringement were matters of "simple pi-
racy," injunctive relief was understandably the norm."5 In recent decades,
however, statutory and technological developments have made it more diffi-
cult for potential users of intellectual property to determine whether their
uses infringe, and often to locate the person whose rights would be in-
fringed. At the same time, because infringement now frequently arises in a
setting where the infringer has incorporated the infringed work into a much
larger and more complex work, removal costs are increasingly high. In this
environment, it should not be surprising that courts would reject automatic
award of injunctive relief for copyright and patent infringement. Review of
recent doctrine establishes that courts, led by the Supreme Court, have in-
creasingly turned away from routine award of injunctive relief, especially in
cases where search costs and removal costs are high. But to lay the founda-
tion before turning to intellectual property cases, I analyze real property
doctrine to demonstrate that courts have exhibited the same tendency in the
most traditional of settings--disputes over boundaries and servitude scope.
A. Real Property
Although real property law is often celebrated (or condemned) as a do-
main in which clear, precise rules are prevalent, in practice, no matter how
clear those rules are "on the books," their scope is not self-evident "on the
ground." Generating clarity often requires investigation. At the same time,
real property law is generally marked by a preference for property rules
rather than liability rules. Despite the general preference, however, courts in
115. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1132-34 (1990) (dis-
tinguishing between cases of simple piracy, in which injunctive relief is routinely awarded, and fair-
use cases, in which Judge Leval concluded that more careful analysis of remedy is required).
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a number of areas have been hesitant to award injunctive relief to a party
who has made significant expenditures in the mistaken belief that he had the
right to make those expenditures-in other words, a party who might have
avoided encroachment by searching more extensively, but who did not
search." 6 In these cases, if the cost of search had been low relative to the
potential harm caused by failure to search, one would expect courts to label
failure to discover the encroachment unreasonable; because courts label the
encroacher's action reasonable and deny the usual property-law remedy, the
inference is strong that they have implicitly concluded that the cost of search
was high relative to the expected benefit of the search.
1. Boundary-Dispute Cases
Consider an improver who builds a building on what she mistakenly be-
lieves to be her own land. The improver could have avoided the mistaken
encroachment by commissioning a survey, or, just to be sure, by commis-
sioning a second survey (because, of course, the first survey might prove
inaccurate)." 7 When the owner of the land discovers the encroachment, she
might seek injunctive relief in one of a number of forms." 8 Protecting the
owner with a property rule would suggest that she should be entitled to in-
junctive relief." 9
Nevertheless, a number of common law courts addressing the problem
of mistaken encroachment have limited the true owner to money damages or
to other relief short of permanent injunction or its equivalent. 20 These courts
explicitly or implicitly label the improver's mistake "innocent" and the im-
prover's decision to build without further investigation "reasonable." In
effect, then, these courts are suggesting further search would have been too
much to expect.
116. Cf Smith, supra note 53, at 1818 (discussing the movement of courts toward damage
awards, in part to avoid inefficient ex ante costs such as surveys).
117. E.g., D'Andrea v. Pringle, 52 Cal. Rptr. 606, 608 (1966) (involving three conflicting
surveys over a three-month period); Amkco, Co. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24 (N.M. 2001) (finding that
landowner's gasoline station encroached by fifty-eight feet because surveyors made a mistaken
assumption about property's boundary); Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, 523 P.2d 1018 (Or. 1974)
(noting that encroachment arises when a party conveys a strip of land on which a building is located
in reliance on an erroneous survey); Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1970) (finding that an
inaccurate survey resulted in fifty-foot discrepancies in a series of deeds); Somerville v. Jacobs, 170
S.E.2d 805, 812 (W. Va. 1969) (noting that landowners built in mistaken reliance on an erroneous
surveyor's report).
118. The landowner might seek removal of the improvement, see, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski,
255 A.2d 258, 258 (N.J. 1969), or, when none of the improvement is on the improver's land, the
landowner might claim to the entire building, see, e.g., Somerville, 170 S.E.2d at 812.
119. Some courts have granted injunctive relief, concluding that failure to conduct a proper
survey precludes the improver from contending that the encroachment was the result of an innocent
mistake. E.g., Sheehan v. Kaden, No. 75292, 1999 WL 166025, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1999).
120. For academic discussion of these cases, see Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of
Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and
Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 9-10; and Sterk, supra note 75, at 61-62.
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In Mannillo v. Gorski, for instance, the improver built steps and a con-
crete walkway that encroached fifteen inches onto a neighbor's twenty-five-
foot-wide lot. The court held that even if the improver could not establish
title to the strip by adverse possession, the owner might be required to con-
vey the strip to the improver for fair value, thus substituting a liability rule
for a property rule. The court emphasized that a rule protecting a true owner
who does not know of the encroachment "may in some cases result in undue
hardship to the adverse possessor who under an innocent and mistaken be-
lief of title has undertaken an extensive improvement which to some extent
encroaches on an adjoining property."' 22
Similarly, in Somerville v. Jacobs,123 the court was confronted with an
improver who, in apparent reliance on an inaccurate survey, built an entire
building on a lot owned by an adjoining owner. In rejecting the adjoining
owner's claim to the building, the court held as follows:
[A]n improver of land owned by another, who through a reasonable mis-
take of fact and in good faith erects a building entirely upon the land of the
owner, with reasonable belief that such land was owned by the improver, is
entitled to recover the value of the improvements ... or, in the alternative,
to purchase the land so improved upon payment to the landowner of the
value of the land ....
One might be tempted to view these cases-and others like them '-as
cases in which the court struggled to avoid a loss of investment to the im-
prover and a windfall to the owner. But in cases that involve the same loss
and the same windfall-and knowing encroachment by the improver-the
owner is almost invariably entitled to injunctive relief without regard to the
hardship injunctive relief would work on the encroacher.126 The distinction
121. 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969), remanding for trial 241 A.2d 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1968).
122. Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 264 (emphasis added).
123. 170 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1969).
124. Somerville, 170 S.E.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., Stuttgart Elec. Co. v. Riceland Seed Co., 802 S.W.2d 484 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991);
Hirshfield v. Schwartz, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (2001) (applying relative hardship doctrine to deny
injunctive relief); Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 137 A.2d 667, 671 (Md. 1958) (denying injunc-
tion requiring expenditure of $60,000 to tear down wall on land worth no more than $500, stating
doctrine of comparative hardship applicable "if the mistake is innocent and ... the invasion and the
benefit to the injured owner are slight"); Kratze v. Indep. Order of Oddfellows, Garden City Codge
No. 1I, 500 N.W.2d 115 (Mich. 1993); Szymczak v. LaFerrara, 655 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995) (applying "relative hardship" doctrine to limit landowner to money damages when inac-
curate survey led neighbor to encroach); Amkco, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24 (N.M. 2001) (applying
the relative hardship doctrine to deny injunction requiring removal of encroaching gas station); Zerr
v. Heceta Lodge No. 11, Indep. Order of Oddfellows, 523 P.2d 1018 (Or. 1974) (applying relative
hardship doctrine to deny injunction to tear down encroaching building).
126. E.g., Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, 553 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001);
McConnell v. Stivers, Nos. 2004-CA-001835-MR, 2004-CA-001894-MR, 2004-CA-002302-MR, &
2004-CA-002213-MR, 2007 WL 80897 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2007). Even when the improver
knows that the owner believes the improvement will encroach, courts have held that the owner is
entitled to injunctive relief. E.g., Goulding v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Mass. 1996) (awarding
injunction when improvers, who were warned to proceed at their own peril, went ahead with their
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between innocent encroachers and those who encroach knowingly has also
been ratified by statutes in states that protect "good faith" improvers against
routine injunctive relief. 121
Why should the improver's knowledge matter? One answer is that the
knowing encroacher did not face a search cost problem: either her
neighbor's legal rights were clear, or the encroacher absorbed the cost of
search and then ignored the results of the search.2 By contrast, in cases like
Mannillo and Somerville, the court's view that the improver was not to
blame for the encroachment, even though further investigation might have
avoided the encroachment, suggests strongly a belief that the improver
should not have had to search-that search was, in effect, inefficient. 29 If
the court had awarded injunctive relief, it would have increased the incentive
for future persons in the same position to expend additional money on more
extensive, and at times inefficient, investigation into their legal rights.
Judicial concern with providing the right incentives and rewards for
search also helps to explain another doctrinal tendency: when the stakes
increase, failure to search becomes less reasonable and more negligent. 30 As
the apparent harm the encroachment inflicts on the owner increases, so does
the likelihood that a court will award injunctive relief to the owner-even if
the harm to the encroacher of complying with the injunction would still be
plans while the matter was still being litigated); Renaissance Dev. Corp. v. Universal Props. Group,
Inc., 821 A.2d 233 (R.I. 2003) (noting that owner had instructed improver not to build); Bach v.
Sarich, 445 P.2d 648, 652 (Wash. 1968) (noting that improvers built "with full knowledge that their
right to do so was contested").
127. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 871.1-.7 (West 2007) (providing protection for good
faith improvers who build on land that turns out not to be their own). By its terms, the statute does
not apply when the landowner builds in part on its own land, apparently because the legislature
deemed common law doctrine adequate to deal with that problem. See id. § 871.6. Where the statute
is applicable, "the degree of negligence of the good faith improver should be taken into account by
the court in determining whether the improver acted in good faith and in determining the relief, if
any, that is consistent with substantial justice to the parties under the circumstances of the particular
case." Id. § 871.3(b) (emphasis added). In Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975),
the court remanded because the trial court had made no finding on negligence, emphasizing the
critical role negligence plays in application of the statute.
128. Professor Lee Anne Fennell has argued that, after the passage of time, the adverse pos-
session doctrine should extend greater protection to knowing encroachers than to innocent
encroachers. Fennell, supra note 51. But she reaches that conclusion in part because other doctrines
provide more effective protection to innocent encroachers. Id. at 1072 (noting that doctrines requir-
ing innocent encroachers to pay for owners' losses "roughly align incentives to avoid mistakes with
the cost those mistakes impose on others").
129. The inefficiency of search costs also provides an answer to a puzzle Professor Fennell
explores: why should legal doctrine protect innocent encroachers? Professor Fennell finds no "posi-
tive correlation between ignorance about the trespass and the social value of the trespass." Id. at
1066-67. She adds that "[tihere is no reason to think that people who are making honest mistakes
are necessarily also making efficient mistakes." Id. at 1067. But innocent encroachment may, in fact,
reflect a calculation that the potential cost of encroachment is smaller than the cost of search. In-
deed, Professor Fennell herself suggests as much. Id. at 1071.
130. As Professor Fennell has put it, "[elncouraging (or failing to discourage) ignorance about
boundaries generates inefficiencies, at least where the costs of obtaining knowledge are relatively
low and the social costs of building beyond one's boundaries are relatively high." Id. at 1071 (em-
phasis added).
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greater."' When the encroacher should recognize the potential harm her ac-
tions might cause, she bears responsibility for addressing the issue, either by
search or by negotiation.
Boundary dispute doctrine implicitly takes search costs into account not
only when fashioning remedies, as in Mannillo and Somerville, but also
when fashioning legal rights. Suppose, for instance, that an owner makes
erroneous representations to a neighbor about the location of the boundary
line, and the neighbor relies on those representations in making improve-
ments. Courts are likely to hold that the owner is estopped from asserting
the "true" boundary line.'32 In effect, courts are holding that the information
furnished by the true owner-either about the location of the boundary, or
about the low value the true owner attaches to the land on the other side of
the apparent boundary line-would make it unreasonable for the improver
to undertake further search costs. The improver, then, should not suffer for
failure to conduct additional search.
2. Servitudes
The existence of a servitude also engenders search costs because the
scope of the servitude will not be self-evident. Thus, an improver may act
under the erroneous belief that a servitude entitles her to make an improve-
ment, or that the improvement does not interfere with a servitude held by a
neighbor. In neither case would the improver be able to resolve uncertainty
about the scope of legal rights without expending resources on lawyers, sur-
veyors, or both. Courts have, in both cases, applied liability rules to protect
improvers from removal costs where the cost of search would appear high
relative to the harm caused by encroachment on a neighbor's legal rights.
First, consider the improver who exceeds the scope of her servitude.
Brown v. Voss is the paradigmatic case. 133 The improver's predecessor ac-
quired a parcel of land and an access easement over a neighboring parcel.
After the improver bought the dominant parcel, he separately bought an ad-
jacent parcel from another seller. The improver then began to build a house
that straddled the boundary between the dominant parcel and the subse-
quently purchased adjacent parcel. When his neighbor, the servient owner,
sought to enjoin use of the easement for non-appurtenant land, the
Washington Supreme Court agreed with the servient owner that use for non-
appurtenant land constituted misuse of the easement,'3 4 but held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief to the servient
131. See Pahl v. Ribero, 14 Cal. Rptr. 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (granting an injunction when
removal cost would be $5,950 and decline in market value of owner's property would have been
$5,600).
132. See, e.g., Grunden v. Hurley, 736 P.2d 548 (Okla. Civ. App. 1987); Burkey v. Baker, 492
P.2d 563 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Estoppel in Property Law, 77 NEB.
L. REV. 756, 788-91 (1998).
133. 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
134. Brown, 715 P.2d at 517.
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owner.3 5 The court in Brown emphasized the trial court's finding that denial
of the injunction would work no appreciable damage or hardship to the ser-
vient owner.116
Consider the issue in Brown from a search-cost perspective: how would
the improver learn that construction of his house would violate his
neighbor's right? First, he was probably unfamiliar with the legal rule that
limits use of an easement to appurtenant land, and might not have known
enough to consult a lawyer to resolve the issue. 3 7 Moreover, although the
house straddled the boundary between his two parcels, it was nowhere near
any boundary between the improver's land and land owned by anyone else.
As a result, a reasonable landowner might not have seen any reason to
commission a survey. Moreover, the neighbor's failure to object while the
house was being built provided the improver with additional information
suggesting that the improver need not expend additional resources investi-
gating his legal rights. In light of the facts as they presented themselves to
the improver, further search would have been unreasonable, and the court's
decision avoided punishing the improver for failing to conduct an unreason-
able search.
Next, consider the improver whose action encroaches on a neighbor's
servitude rights. Two situations recur. In the first, the improver's building
may extend over the boundary of a neighbor's easement. The improver
knows of the easement, but faces the same issue raised in boundary dispute
cases: the location of the easement cannot be determined without a survey.
In the second situation, a landowner whose parcel is subject to an easement
may not know of the easement's existence, or even if she knows of the
easement's existence, she may not have any idea that her construction is
anywhere near the easement.
Vossen v. Forrester illustrates this second problem.'38 Improver obtained
a permit to build a beachfront house. Although some neighbors had opposed
grant of the permit on the ground that improver's lot was too small, the
neighbors had not raised any easement issues. In reliance on the permit, im-
prover built the house, not realizing that it encroached by 2.08 feet onto a
neighbor's easement. In fact, a title report disclosed the existence of an
easement, but described the easement only by reference to its location in the
title records. By contrast, the title report described other easements with
more particularity. A map that accompanied the title report did not disclose
the easement's location. After the house was built, a neighbor who had stood
silent during construction sought to enjoin the improver from encroaching
on the easement.' 39 In holding that the neighbor was not entitled to an in-
135. Id. at 517-18.
136. Id. at 518.
137. After the case was resolved, the improver indicated that he had always assumed that he
had a right to use the easement to get to his house. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Stories Out of School:
Teaching the Case of Brown v. Voss, 16 CAROOZO L. REV. 1445, 1467 (1995).
138. 963 P.2d 157 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
139. Vossen, 963 P.2d at 158.
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junction, the court ordered relocation of the easement, observing that even
though the title report provided the improver with actual notice of the ease-
ment, the improver did not have actual knowledge that he was encroaching
on the easement.'40 Implicit in the court's analysis is the premise that im-
prover's failure to discover the easement's precise location was not
sufficiently blameworthy to preclude application of the relative hardship
doctrine. 
4
'
In other cases, courts have also limited the holder of a servitude to
money damages when further investigation by the burdened party to deter-
mine whether its actions would violate the restriction would have been
unreasonable. Drulard v. Le Tourneau is illustrative. 42 In a subdivision with
panoramic views of Mt. Hood and Mt. St. Helens, all lots were subject to a
deed restriction prohibiting erection of a house "having more than one story
above the level of the street upon which such building fronts.' 43 Purchasers
of one of the lots proposed to build a house that included a basement with
"daylight windows."' 44 The purchasers filed a complete set of plans for the
house, and, even before filing the plans, met with their next-door neighbors
to show them a picture and plans of the proposed house. The neighbors
never made any objection until after the house had been framed and roofed,
at which time the neighbors contended that the house was a two-story house
in violation of the restrictive covenant. When the neighbors sought to enjoin
violation of the restriction, the court denied the injunction emphasizing the
purchasers' good faith belief that the house complied with the building re-
strictions and the neighbors' delay in raising objections-even after
purchasers had furnished them with a complete set of plans. 45
The court in Drulard recognized that the purchasers faced uncertainty
about their right to build the proposed house.146 The only way the purchasers
could have resolved that uncertainty was through litigation before construc-
tion. 14 Instead, they sought to assure that their neighbors would not object to
140. Id. at 161.
141. See Alabama Power Co. v. Drummond, 559 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1990) (denying injunctive
relief to power company against homeowner who unintentionally built a house atop the company's
flood easement when, although the easement was of record and homeowner knew of the easement's
existence, she did not know that the house itself encroached). By contrast, courts invariably refuse to
apply the relative hardship doctrine, which permits court to deny injunctive relief when the cost of
removing an encroachment is high relative to the damage caused by the encroachment, in cases
where the encroacher knew of the encroachment or "proceeded despite notice or warning." Ariola v.
Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (I11. 1959).
142. 593 P.2d 1118 (Or. 1979).
143. Drulard, 593 P.2d at 1119.
144. Id. at 1120.
145. Id. at 1123.
146. The court never formally determined whether the purchasers' house violated the cove-
nant. Instead, the court noted that there was a serious question about compliance, and concluded that
even if the house did violate the covenant, the neighbor was not entitled to injunctive relief (or, for
that matter, to damages, because the neighbor had not adequately proved harm). Id. at 1123-25.
147. Perhaps the purchasers could have contracted with the neighbors in the face of uncer-
tainty, but because the source of the uncertainty was contained in a subdivision restriction, the
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the house. The court's holding in effect recognized that, in light of theS. , 148
minimal harm to the neighbors as a result of the building, it would have
been unreasonable and inefficient for the purchasers to investigate further
especially when investigation would have required litigation. 49
By contrast, in those cases where a landowner knowingly violates the
terms of a servitude,15 or builds after his neighbor warns of a violation or
initiates litigation to prevent construction,151 courts routinely award injunc-
tive relief, even if the injunction threatens to impose significant and concrete
costs on the infringing landowner while providing less quantifiable benefits
to neighbors. In cases of knowing encroachment, the encroacher faces no
uncertainty. In cases of encroachment in the face of litigation, the threat of
litigation itself serves as a signal that the dominant owner attaches signifi-
cant value to her servitude right, making encroachment without search a less
reasonable alternative. Injunctive relief in these cases, then, is less likely to
purchasers might have faced significant holdout costs, because, in all likelihood, each of the
neighbors would have had standing to enforce the restriction. As one commentator has noted,
[w]here the agreement in question is entered into pursuant to a general building plan for the
subdivision, the courts uniformly hold that evidence of the existence of such a plan at the time
the agreement is made will be sufficient evidence of an intention to attach the benefit to the
remaining lots of the subdivider.
II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.29, at 418 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
148. The restrictive covenant unequivocally permitted the purchaser to build a one-story
house twenty-four feet in height, leading the court to conclude that the measure of damages would
be the difference between the value of the neighbors' house with a one-story, twenty-four-foot house
next door, and the value with the purchasers' house (which did not exceed twenty-four feet in
height) next door. The court noted that the neighbors had offered no evidence of damages measured
by this standard. Drulard, 593 P.2d at 1124-25.
149. See Holmes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 508 P.2d 628 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (denying
injunctive relief for violation of height restriction when scope of prohibition was uncertain, land-
owner attempted to comply with restrictive covenant, neighbor delayed bringing suit until
construction was complete, and cost of removal was high compared with damage to the neighbor).
150. See, e.g., Flying Diamond Airpark, LLC v. Meienberg, 156 P.3d 1149 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2007) (awarding injunctive relief against violation of height restriction when builder had been
warned before commencing construction that proposed building would violate restriction); Gen.
Am. Realty Co. v. Greene, 438 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (granting injunctive relief requiring
removal of portions of building when builder constructed building knowing that it was directly
above the easement, and finding the dominant owner's failure to show harm irrelevant); Aragon v.
Brown, 78 P.3d 913 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (issuing an injunction requiring removal of manufactured
home in violation of restrictive covenant when landowner had actual knowledge of the covenant's
prohibition).
151. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Larsen. 583 P.2d 971 (Haw. 1978) (awarding injunction when
landowner completed construction in violation of height restriction after neighbors had warned
landowner to cease construction until issue was resolved); Davis v. Huey, 608 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1980) (awarding injunction against improvements made in violation of covenants when
landowners "deliberately and intentionally proceeded with the construction of their building ...
knowing that their right to do so was being challenged in court"); Bauman v. Turpen, 160 P.3d 1050
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (issuing an injunction that required landowner to modify the roof of an al-
ready-constructed home when landowner began construction after neighbors sought injunctive relief
for violation of restrictive covenant limiting houses to one story); Curtis v. Chinn, No. 44408-5-I,
2000 WL 703008 (Wash. Ct. App. May 30, 2000) (issuing injunction requiring removal of addition
when neighbor warned landowner that addition violated height restriction and began litigation as
soon as landowner started construction).
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provide incentives for inefficient searches, or to punish landowners who
acted reasonably when they acted without searching.
B. Copyright
High search costs present significant problems with respect to copyright.
In a number of areas, copyright doctrine is inherently fuzzy.,5 2 Even when
the doctrine is relatively clear, locating the current right holder can be diffi-
cult. Moreover, though independent creation is a defense to copyright
infringement, many parties may be liable for infringement without actual
knowledge of another's copying: the publisher of a book by a novelist who
pirated the story line, or the producer of a movie whose director or screen-
play writer has copied characters or drawings.
53
Most of these search-cost problems are of relatively recent vintage. As
Anthony Reese has recently demonstrated, copyright doctrine historically
provided considerable immunity to unknowing infringers.'5 4 First, copyright
originally provided such limited protection that doctrinal fuzziness was not
a significant problem for potential users of copyrighted work. 55 Second,
notice and registration requirements, together with a shorter copyright pe-
riod, made it easier for a potential user to ascertain whether her work would
infringe, and to locate the right holder in cases where the potential use re-
quired consent of that right holder.'1 6 Third, at least one class of potential
152. For instance, copyright protects only expression, not ideas. Learned Hand remarked, in a
case involving the alleged infringement of a play, that there is a point in a series of abstractions
about a play "where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended .... Nobody
has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citations omitted); see also Reyher v. Children's Television Work-
shop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that copyright protects expression, but not ideas).
Moreover, even when an alleged infringer uses protected expression, the multifactored "fair-use"
doctrine may authorize the appropriation. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (enumerating fair-use factors).
As a result of these problems, "[a] user may know that a particular work is copyrighted, but that
knowledge gives him little sense of whether a particular use of the work is legal or not." Mark A.
Lemley, Reply, What's Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2005).
153. See, e.g., DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding publisher liable for
infringement even if it erroneously relied on assurances of author).
154. Reese, supra note 106.
155. In particular, nineteenth-century copyright law protected largely against reproduction and
distribution of a copyrighted work, not against taking extracts from the work or producing derivative
works. Thus, translating Uncle Tom's Cabin into German did not constitute infringement of Stowe's
copyright. Stowe v. Thomas. 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). See generally Reese,
supra note 106, at 140-44, 178 (describing narrow scope of early copyright protection, particularly
with respect to derivative works).
156. Congress endorsed the notice requirement as late as 1976, largely to protect innocent
improvers against the burdens of search. The House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act
enumerated the functions of the copyright notice: "(2) It informs the public as to whether a particu-
lar work is copyrighted; (3) It identifies the copyright owner; and (4) It shows the date of
publication." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 143 (1976). The report went on to explain why the notice
requirement should be retained:
[A] person acting in good faith and with no reason to think otherwise should ordinarily be able
to assume that a work is in the public domain if there is no notice on an authorized copy or
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unknowing infringers-sellers of infringing works-were liable for in-
fringement only if they had knowledge of the infringement.'57
Today, by contrast, copyright protection attaches automatically to an
original work of authorship as soon as it is "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression."'5 s An author, therefore, need not take any affirmative steps to
secure copyright protection. Congress also abandoned the requirement of
copyright notice in 1988.59 Abolition of notice and registration require-
ments, together with the expanded duration of copyright protection, has
significantly increased search costs for potential users of works of author-
ship. At the same time, the expanded scope and duration of copyright
protection has increased the need for potential users to investigate the scope
of authorial protection and the identity of the current holder of rights in
those works.
Many of the circumstances in which users of copyrighted work face high
search costs are also circumstances in which infringement would generate
low social harm, but high removal costs-the very constellation in which
injunctive relief is most likely to lead to inefficient search. Assume that the
social harm of infringement can be measured by the harm to the copyright
holder minus the infringer's avoidance cost.' 6° The harm to the owner is of-
ten small because the copyright holder is not currently exploiting the same
market as the infringer, or is not exploiting any market at all.' 6' Avoidance
phonorecord and... if he relies on this assumption, he should be shielded from unreasonable
liability.
Id. at 148. The duration of copyright protection, initially fourteen years, Copyright Act of 1790, ch.
15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), has gradually expanded to the current "life plus seventy years"
formulation. Especially significant in expanding the number of works subject to copyright was the
1976 Act's substitution of a unitary term from the previous practice of requiring renewal after
twenty-eight years-a practice which resulted in the vast majority of copyrighted works falling into
the public domain after twenty-eight years.
157. E.g., Reese, supra note 106, at 156-60.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
159. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 amended sections 401 and 402 of the
Copyright Act to strike out the requirement that copyright notice "shall be placed on all" publicly
distributed copies and phonorecords and to substitute a requirement that notice "may be placed on"
those copies and phonorecords. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codifed as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (2000)). The statute retained
some incentive to include notice on copies by making it more difficult for an infringer to contend
that his infringement was innocent, and should therefore subject him to reduced actual or statutory
damages, when notice was affixed to all copies. §§ 401(d), 402(d).
160. The assumption here is that the bundle of rights the copyright statute gives to the copy-
right holder roughly accounts for the external benefits and costs of copyright protection. Protection
generates public benefits (by providing an incentive for authors to create potentially valuable
works), but also imposes costs on the public (by limiting the ability of future authors to build on
those works, and by increasing the cost of public access to works in which the author enjoys copy-
right protection). There is no a priori basis for assuring that the correlation is perfect. See James
Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual
Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2013 (2000).
161. Copyright law provides remedies for the copyright holder in this situation largely to
discourage the user from bypassing the market "by stealing the copyright and forcing the owner to
seek compensation from the courts." Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J.).
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costs may be positive, but small, because the user can avoid infringement by
substituting non-infringing-but presumably inferior-material. 6 By con-
trast, removal costs may be high because once infringement occurs, the
infringer may have no practical mechanism for segregating infringing from
non-infringing material. 
6
1
Consider, for instance, George Harrison's unconscious infringement of
"He's So Fine" in his composition of "My Sweet Lord." '64 By the time of the
infringement, "He's So Fine" had little commercial value. Yet once Harri-
son had composed "My Sweet Lord," he could not easily have altered the
song to avoid infringement; the infringing phrase was an integral part of the
song. As a result, the copyright holder of "He's So Fine," if awarded injunc-
tive relief, would have been in a position to extract much of the commercial
value of "My Sweet Lord"-in effect imposing high removal costs on Harri-
son. The problem is exacerbated when the infringed material represents a
small fraction of the value of significant infringing work. Removal costs-
the cost of recording a new version of a song, excising a scene from a big-
budget movie, or republishing a novel without the infringing content-may
be quite high. Those costs will be felt not merely by the infringer, but by
non-infringing contributors to the infringing work.' 66 When removal costs
are high, property-rule protection-awarding injunctive relief to the copy-
right holder-is likely to encourage inefficient search and punish users who
act efficiently. 67
162. Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 RUT-
GERS L. REv. 351, 414 (2002) (noting that innocent users facing risk of liability can curtail use of
copyrighted work, and ultimately reduce their level of creative activity).
163. E.g., Gibson, supra note 67, at 890 (noting high costs that might be engendered by in-
junctive relief in infringement cases).
164. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
165. Settlement negotiations between Harrison and the holder of the copyright in "He's So
Fine" yielded an offer by Harrison of $148,000, an offer the copyright holder's lawyer regarded as
"a good one." ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), modified, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). The total earnings of "My Sweet Lord," by contrast,
exceeded $2,000,000. Id. at 801.
166. Not only do these high removal costs increase the potential users' incentive to search, but
as suggested in Section III.C, they increase the potential users' incentive to negotiate with ostensible
owners, even when ownership is uncertain. James Gibson has recently noted that licensing in the
face of uncertainty has an unintended and potentially unwelcome consequence: it expands the scope
of copyright protection by establishing the existence of a licensing market-a factor courts and
scholars deem relevant to fair-use analysis. Gibson, supra note 67, at 888-98.
167. See generally Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 162, at 376-85 (challenging notion that
potential infringer is the "cheapest cost avoider" in light of the uncertainties generated by copyright
law). Mark Lemley and Philip Weiser have recently emphasized another reason to believe that in-
junctive relief promotes inefficiency in copyright cases: injunctions, or bargains conducted in the
shadow of injunctions, can generate negative externalities. Injunctive relief effectively gives copy-
right holders leverage "to control a wide swath of noninfringing uses." Mark A. Lemley & Philip J.
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Thx. L. REV. 783, 796 (2007).
That is, injunctive relief can operate not merely to adjust the relative positions of the copyright
holder and the infringer, but also to deprive the public of works that would otherwise be available.
See Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copy-
right, 83 WAsH. U. L.Q. 417, 460-61 (2005).
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The current copyright statute does not, by its terms, require routine
award of injunctive relief, 68 but courts have long indulged in a presumption
that favors enjoining infringing behavior. The Supreme Court has in recent
years led the way in rethinking that presumption, motivated, in part, by
search cost concerns. The search cost issue arose most directly in New York
Times Co. v. Tasini.70 Freelance authors who had provided articles for publi-
cation in newspapers brought suit to enjoin newspapers and electronic
publishers from placing their articles onto electronic databases without the
permission of the authors. The court found infringement over Justice
Stevens's dissent which focused, in part, on search costs. Justice Stevens
wrote that "the difficulties of locating individual freelance authors ... may
well have the effect of forcing electronic archives to purge freelance pieces
from their databases.""' The majority responded by suggesting that the
search- cost issue could be addressed in considering the appropriate rem-
edy. 1
7
Abend v. MCA, Inc. provides what is perhaps the clearest illustration of a
court's willingness to limit a copyright holder to money damages when fur-
ther search by the infringer would have been clearly inefficient.7 1 In 1954,
Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy Stewart formed a production company to pro-
duce Rear Window, a movie based on a story by Cornell Woolrich. Woolrich
had previously assigned the right to make a motion picture of the story, and
had agreed with the assignee that he would renew his copyright and also
assign the same motion picture rights for the twenty-eight-year copyright
renewal term. The production company formed by Hitchcock and Stewart
purchased the motion picture rights from Woolrich's assignee and proceeded
to produce and distribute the movie. Woolrich, however, died before he
could renew the copyright and assign motion picture rights to the assignee.
Instead, the executor of his estate renewed the copyright, and assigned the
copyright to Abend. Abend then brought a copyright infringement action
against Hitchcock, Stewart, and others, alleging that rerelease of the movie
infringed his copyright in the Woolrich story.174
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000) ("Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising
under this title may... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reason-
able to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.") (emphasis added).
169. For example, in Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., the court wrote that
"a showing of a prima facie case of copyright infringement or reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm," 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983)-a pre-
sumption that leads to the award of a preliminary injunction.
170. 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
171. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
172. The Court noted that "it hardly follows from today's decision that an injunction against
the inclusion of these Articles in the Databases ... must issue," id. at 505 (majority opinion), and
held that remedial issues were "open for initial airing and decision in the District Court," id. at 506.
173. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990).
174. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1468.
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Note the search problem facing Stewart and Hitchcock. If, as the Su-
preme Court had previously held, an author's assignment of renewal rights
did not bind the author's statutory successor in cases where the author died
before the renewal right accrued,'75 how could Stewart and Hitchcock have
discovered the identity of the owner of those renewal rights? The owner's
identity would not have been settled until Woolrich's death-which did not
occur until fifteen years after they had negotiated for the rights to make
Rear Window. Search, then, would have been inefficient in the extreme. Not
surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit denied Abend injunctive relief notwithstand-
ing their conclusion that his rights had been infringed.
Tasini and Abend do not stand alone as authority for the denial of injunc-
116tive relief. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court
denied injunctive relief in a case where the fuzzy boundaries of parody
would have made it difficult-if not impossible-for the infringer to deter-
mine whether his composition constituted infringement. Although the Court
ultimately decided that the parody at issue constituted fair use, the opinion
went on to suggest that "courts may also wish to bear in mind that the goals
of the copyright law ... are not always best served by automatically grant-
ing injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the
bounds of fair use.""' Other courts have also denied injunctive relief in cases
where search costs would have been high and injunctive relief would impose
heavy removal costs. Most recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its
conclusion that in copyright and patent cases, injunctive relief is a discre-
tionary equitable remedy, and not a matter of absolute right.'
78
C. Patent Law
Unlike copyright protection, which arises without any affirmative action
by an author,179 patent protection requires application to the federal govem-
ment.' 8° The patent-filing process, which requires disclosure of the claimed
invention, mitigates two of the search difficulties associated with copyright:
discovering the identity of the copyright owner, and the potential enforce-
ment of rights by the author of an unregistered work.
Despite these advantages, uncertainty about the scope and existence of
legal rights is more pervasive in the patent realm than in the copyright
realm. One significant problem arises at a basic level of patent theory-
unlike copyright law, patent law does not recognize independent creation as
175. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
176. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
177. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
178. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
179. Title 17, section 102(a) of the United States Code provides that copyright protection
"subsists" in original works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
180. Title 35, section 11I of the United States Code provides that "[a]n application for patent
shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor." 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
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a defense to an infringement claim.18 1 Other problems are intensely practical.
Conducting a patent search, for example, is not a routine matter. ' Although
a dizzying array of commercial databases have developed to assist in the
search process, none of these databases are comprehensive, and none dis-
pense with the searcher's need to consider a variety of classifications that
might apply to a particular invention.
83
Even if a potential user discovers a patent that has been issued, she must
still determine not only whether the patent claim covers the desired use, but
also whether the patent itself is even valid. Evaluating the meaning of patent
claims is no easy matter.' " In addition, the relatively rudimentary scrutiny
that patent applications receive from the patent and trademark office"' re-
sults in judicial invalidation of nearly half of the patents that are litigated to
final judgment, 1 6 significantly complicating the search enterprise.
Finally, a patent applicant can make it difficult for a prospective user to
obtain information about the existence and scope of the patent by filing con-
tinuation applications before the patent office issues the patent. As a result,
even though a patent search will not reveal the patent, a person who uses the
invention or process will nevertheless be an infringer.8 7 Although Congress
has acted to require publication of patent applications within eighteen
months after filing,"' theoretically ameliorating the problem of surprise,
181. For a discussion of this difference, see Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REv. 465, 525-33 (2004).
182. A patent search tutorial prepared by the University of Texas engineering library estimates
that the average preliminary search takes between twenty-five and thirty hours, and an exhaustive
search requires exploration of other avenues. McKinney Engineering Library Patent Searching
Guide, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/engin/patent-tutorial/tutorial/patenttutorialframeset.htm (follow
"Introduction" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
183. For a discussion of the various commercial databases and the difficulties of searching,
see John T. Butler, Electronic Resources for Patent Searching, 84 LAw LIBR. J. 121 (1992).
184. A number of studies suggest that even federal district judges misunderstand the meaning
of those claims about a third of the time. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Cir-
cuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1103-04 (2001); Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2001);
Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
215, 236 (2007).
185. Although patent applications may take two to three years to process, a patent examiner
spends an average of about eighteen hours on each application. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Igno-
rance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001). Nearly eighty-five percent of
patent applications in the United States result in an issued patent. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 78,
at 79.
186. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).
187. For a description of the process of obtaining so-called submarine patents, see Steve
Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around a Patent that
a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11 (1999); David B.
Conrad, Mining the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Automatic Injunction Rule
in eBay v. MercExchange, 26 REV. LITIG. 119, 140-45 (2007); and Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1239-43 (2000).
188. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
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those filings do not eliminate uncertainty, because a potential user still will
not know whether the application will be granted.'8
9
While patent law presents potential users with significant uncertainty,
the prospect of injunctive relief concurrently threatens the user with high
removal costs. Once a product or process has been designed in a way that
incorporates a patented invention, redesigning the product might require
shutdown for retooling.' 90 In addition, especially when the patented inven-
tion is a small component in the design of a complex product or process, a
redesign around the patented invention may take substantial effort and re-
quire the user to acquire a different set of patent rights at considerable
additional cost.' 9'
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., a unanimous Supreme Court held
that injunctive relief should not be automatic in patent cases, but should
rather be subject to the same four-factor test historically applied by equity
courts.' 9' There are many reasons to applaud the Court's decision. One of
those reasons is that eBay reduces the incentive for potential users to engage
in inefficient patent searches-especially those where the harm generated by
infringement is smaller than the cost of additional search. Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion, joined by three other Justices, strongly suggests that
money damages should suffice in those cases where uncertainty is most per-
vasive, and where removal costs (which give leverage to the patent holder)
are high.193 Kennedy's concurrence emphasized that where "the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement."' 94 But
those cases in which the threat of an injunction is employed simply for lev-
erage are the cases in which infringement causes no social harm 9-the very
189. This uncertainty is particularly problematic with continuation applications, because the
patentee can continue to change claims to track competitors until the patent is issued. See Mark A.
Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 88-90
(2004). Moreover, applicants for "submarine patents" can avoid the publication requirement by not
filing or publishing abroad. Id. at 88-89.
190. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 97, at 1997 (discussing lost sales resulting from time
lag caused by redesign around the patent).
191. Mark Lemley and Philip Weiser state as follows:
[lInjunctions against infringement of a patent covering a small component of a larger product
will end up preventing the sale of all the noninfringing components of the product, at least un-
til the defendant can redesign its product to exclude the infringing component. In the case of
hardware such as semiconductors or cell phones, pulling and redesigning the product can po-
tentially involve a year of additional research and development and tens of millions of dollars.
Lemley & Weiser, supra note 167, at 797-98; see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 97, at 1997
(noting that redesign costs "could be so large that redesigning the product is not commercially fea-
sible").
192. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
193. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Id.
195. The assumption here is that if the patent owner has suffered no losses, there is no social
harm, because patent law has been properly calibrated to provide the patent holder with optimal
incentives to innovate. See, e.g., id. at 1837 (majority opinion).
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cases in which further search is likely to be inefficient. The Kennedy con-
currence also suggests that the four-factor test should be applied with an eye
to the "potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these patents.' 96
In other words, courts should consider the high cost of determining whether
use of the invention would, in fact, encroach on a patent holder's rights.
Moreover, like real property doctrine, patent doctrine takes search costs
into account when fashioning rights as well as remedies. Thus, the doctrine
of prosecution laches bars infringement claims by a patent holder who re-
files an application containing previously allowed claims in order to delay
issuance of the patent, thereby obfuscating what is patented and what is
not.197 Prosecution laches-like estoppel doctrine in real property law 9s-
denies all relief to an owner whose actions induce potential users to believe
that use without search is permissible.'99
Thus, by limiting the leverage patent owners can exercise against in-
fringers who could not easily have discovered their infringement, patent
doctrine discourages inefficient expenditures directed to increasing certainty
about the scope of legal rights.'°°
CONCLUSION
"Ignorance of the law is no excuse"-an ancient maxim drawn from
criminal law2° '-reflects an implicit assumption in much of the academic
writing about property rights and protections. Property scholarship suggests
the importance of developing doctrinal rules that are clear and easily under-
stood, and then assumes that parties who violate the rights defined by those
rules should do so at their peril-which typically includes the peril of prop-
erty-rule protection, injunctive relief.
196. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med. Educ. & Research Found., LP, 422 F3d.
1378, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The doctrine can be traced to two earlier Supreme Court cases,
Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50 (1923), and Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical
Co., 264 U.S. 463 (1924).
198. See supra text accompanying note 132.
199. Moreover, when a patent holder does not delay in prosecuting the patent application, but
instead delays in bringing actions for infringement, the Federal Circuit has held that laches may bar
injunctive relief against the user of an infringing product who may have been lulled into acting in
reliance on a belief that the product's use would not generate legal liability. See Odetics, Inc. v.
Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1272-74 (Fed. Cit. 1999). After noting that permitting injunc-
tive relief would permit the patent holder to extract from the infringer the cost of shifting to a
noninfringing product, which might be more than a reasonable royalty, the court emphasized that
such a result "would encourage patentees to adopt a strategy of ambush rather than providing fair
notice." Id. at 1273. That is, when the owner could have acted to reduce the user's search costs, but
didn't, the owner may not be entitled to injunctive relief.
200. Mark Lemley has recently noted that under existing law many researchers and compa-
nies simply don't engage in patent searches, instead taking their chances on the outcome of potential
litigation. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
201. For application of the maxim to a modem gun control case-and discussion of limits on
application of the maxim even in criminal law-see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-96
(1998).
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The advantages of property-rule protection are many-including en-
couraging investment, facilitating market exchange, and protecting
subjective value. Even the most fervent advocates of property rule protec-
tion, however, have recognized that context is critical. Sometimes, an
exclusive focus on market ordering would lead to unacceptable inefficien-
cies .
Judicial doctrine has quietly-if not silently-adapted to a set of facts
largely ignored by academic commentary. Even when rules are clear on their
face, expensive investigation may be necessary to determine how they apply
to concrete facts. Search, in these cases, is often inefficient because the re-
sulting social gains may be much smaller than the cost of the search.
Injunctive relief threatens to impose private costs on parties who fail to
search even when those private costs exceed the social benefits that would
be derived from search. As a result, routine award of injunctive relief pun-
ishes actors who have acted reasonably and efficiently-and provides
incentives for future actors to engage in inefficient searches.
None of these facts suggest that ignorance of the law--or of the facts-
should excuse encroachment of property rights. They do suggest, however,
that in cases where the cost of search would be particularly high relative to
the harm caused by encroachment, the high cost of search should be a miti-
gating factor in determining what remedy to award the property owner.
202. Thus, Richard Epstein, a staunch defender of property rules, concedes that in cases of
necessity, property rules would be inefficient:
The need to save life is so evident that the law allows the individual at risk to use someone
else's property as though it were his own.... No one could seriously maintain that for some
hidden reason the owner has greater need for his dock that the sailor who is at risk for his
life.... Only cynics doubt that, at the critical moment, the boat owner attaches greater value to
the use of the dock than the dock owner attaches to his right to exclude.
Epstein, supra note 3, at 2110 (1997).
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